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The Law Clerks: Profile of an

Institution*
Paul R. Baier**
The law

is

not made by judge alone, but by judge and
company.
l.

-

Jeremy Bentham

INTRODUCTION

Every ten years or so someone in the literature writes about the
law clerks. In the fifties, a flurry of articles appeared in

US.

News

& World Report and in the New York Times focusing on law clerks
who serve Justices of the United States Supreme Court.1 The ques
tions considered were whether these clerks were a "second team,"
and whether, as a result, the opinions of the Court were really only
the apocrypha of the law clerks. If so, shouldn't this otherwise un
noticed influence be exposed and condemned? A recent appointee
to the United States Supreme Court and former clerk himself, Jus
tice William Rehnquist, was a principal in the effort, arguing under
the title "Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?" that clerk
ship "influence" did exist, particularly on the Court's handling of
petitions for certiorari, and that "because of the political outlook of
the group of clerks that I knew, its direction would be to the political
'left.' "2 Several articles were written rebutting these allegations, all
This paper was read as the invocation address at the first Law Clerk Institute, Louisi

*

ana State University Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Aug. 30 to Sept. 1,

1972.

The

Institute is sponsored by the Appellate Judges Conference of the Division of Judicial Adminis
l
tration of the American Bar Association and by the Louisiana State University Law Schoo.
The program is now an annual event. The second Institute was held this past August
again at Louisiana State University, and several contributors to this symposium issue partici
pated as faculty, including Professor Baier, Justice Robert Braucher, Chief Judge Lesinski,
and Judge Eugene Wright.
**

Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.A.B.,

University of Cincinnati; J.D.,

1969,

1966,

Harvard University.

1. See, e.g., The Bright Young Men Behind the Bench, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
12, 1957, at 45.
2. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Dec. 13, 1957, at 74, 75. See also Justice Tom Clark's observation in Internal Opera
tion of the United States Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. Juo. Soc'v 45, 48 (1959) , quoting Justice
July

Robert Jackson:
A suspicion has grown at the bar that the law clerks ... constitute a kind of junior
court which decides the fate of the certiorari petitions. This idea of the law clerk's
influence gave rise to a lawyer's waggish statement that the Senate no longer need bother
about confirmation of justices but ought to confirm the appointment of law clerks.
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authored by equally distinguished men and former clerks to Justices
of the Supreme Court.
William Rogers, who once clerked for Justice Reed, wrote that
during his service he never witnessed a law clerk ex ercising any
substantial influence on the decision making of the Justices. It was
Rogers's thesis that because the duties of the clerks were often on
the technical rather than the policy side of j udgment, undue influ
ence was improbable:
The law clerks perform the drudgery of judging-looking up citations.

examin

ing old cases for apt quotations, general research. T his liberates the .Justices
for their own important work. Theirs is the ultimate responsibility to decide

vote is cast in secret
law clerks are rigorously barred."

and vote yea or nay on each case. And this
the Justices, from which the

conference of

A different point, but one still in rebuttal, was that of Professor
Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School. Analyz ing the charge of
influence, Professor Bickel's response was to concede it, but only
after carefully detailing the "larger function" of the l a w clerk, a
function that includes more than just running the research errands.
In Bickel's depiction, the law clerk is the young intellectual coll abo
rator, fulfilling Bentham's dictum, "the law is not made by judge
alone, but by judge and company . " Properly understood, the law
clerk's contribution-even if labeled "influence"-is toward en
hancement of the intellectual integrity of the judicial process. The
clerkship, according to Bickel, "is in its modest way one of the
influences that keep judicial law rationally responsive to the needs
of the day."�
No doubt the delegation issue makes for colorful j o urnalism.
Indeed, it provides a nice beginning here too, for hopefully you are
now on the edge of your seat willing to listen to me further. I should
think if anything can pique your legal ears at the outset, it is the
thought that for the ensuing year you will find yourself acting, de
facto, as a jurist. But all of this must await later discussion. There
is first the need to detail just what it is the law clerks do. We then
will b e in a better position to see how the clerk's duties measure up
against traditional notions of the judicial function . We need not
wholly abandon the delegation issue, however, to find an appropri3.

Rogers, Do Law Clerks Wield Power in Supreme Court Cases?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REPORT, Feb. 21, 1958, at 1 14, 116.
4. Bickel, The Court: An Indictment Analyzed, N .Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1958, § 6 (Maga
.
zine). at 16, 69. Judge Samuel H. Hofstadter commented on this article in a letter to the
Tim<'8. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1958, § 6 (Magazine), at 4. Professor Bickel had earlier pub
h�hed an account of the law clerks in his book, POLITICS AND THEW ARREN COURT 139-45 (1955).
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ate beginning, a sort of theme for the remarks that follow. Mr.
Justice Rehnquis t concluded his rejoinder to the good Professor
Bickel and Mr. Rogers with this paragraph:
The resolution of these disagreements must await a thorough, impartial

study of t h e matter by someone who is not personally involved. Meanwhile,
every expression of a point of view by someone who was on the scene, even in
as small a way as we were, is bound to contribute to a better understanding of
this phase of the judicial process.5
Under the terms of my charge at this first Law Clerk Institute
I am supposed to sketch the history of the clerkship institution, the
duties generally associated with the task of clerking, and the im
portance of the position in judicial administration. I will also add
something of my own about the discoveries you can expect to make,
and retain for yourselves, as fledgling participants in the judicial
process. Where appropriate I plan to season my observations with
personal recollections drawn from my own clerkship experience-no
doubt to an excess, but I simply can't resist the opportunity.
I speak to you as fellow law clerk, but unlike you who have it
all to anticipate, I must look back almost three years to reflect again
on my clerking days. It was my good fortune to clerk for Judge John
H. Gillis at the Michigan Court of Appeals, the intermediate, work
horse appellate level in Michigan. Although this was not work for
any status court, the job was clerking nonetheless. Out of the experi
ence was born my present interest in the judicial process generally
and in the law clerkship as aid to that process. It was at the Michi
gan Court of Appeals that I first met T. John Lesinski, Chief Judge
of the court and official consultant to this Institute.6 Judge Lesinski
first mentioned the idea of a workshop for prospective clerks before
they begin their tenure. 7 He also suggested that there should be a

manual on clerking available for use in both state and federal courts
acr oss the country.8 I always thought these ideas were sound ones,
especially since it was not until midyear in my clerkship-perhaps

not until the very end-that I first felt secure as a clerk and knowl5. Rehnquist, Another View: Clerk.� Might "lnffuence" Some Actions, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1958, at 116.
6. .Judge Lesinski is currently Chairman of the Appellate Judges Conference. Sect ion

of .Jud icial Administration of the American Bar Association.
Institute is recounted
7. T he origin of the idea and the planning for the first Law Clerk

more fully in the Appendix to this article.

preparation of such a manual. All clerks nttend
R. The Law Clerk Institute has begun
h<'Y
hnd
t
ions
�
instruc
written
er
ing the first program were asked to bring with them whatev
·
·
1111on lo
the1r
· cIerksh'1p. F rom these and other mform
received from their court on beginning
·
result.
will
he coll ected it is hoped a comprehensive manual on law clerkin�
·
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edgeable in the "art" of law clerking. The word is chosen intention
ally. The ropes of clerking are hard enough to learn without the
added burden of approaching the task in ignorance. Yet the tradi
tional approach-the casual suggestion to the novitiate to "take a
crack at it"9-hardly seems fit to nurture sound performance of the
job from the start. I remember thinking near the end of my stay how
strange that I should leave the court with-to use a former law
professor's phrase-the eagles perched on my shoulders, only to
make room for my purblind successor.
In the view of its planners, this Institute offers a real chance to
improve the performance of the clerkship function. My efforts at
description of the clerkship institution are only the first in a pro
gram designed to immerse you in the process of law clerking, as is
apparent from the Institute's prospectus.1° The end in view is the
important one of getting the job of clerking done at the next term
of appellate courts throughout the nation more efficiently than at
the last. The goal is to provide guidance at the outset, rather than
allowing experience to serve as exclusive tutor.11 Our expectations
are not grandiose. We only hope to send next year's clerks to the
business of clerking knowing from the start something about the
tasks ahead and how best to accomplish them.
I cannot resist one final introductory remark. I have it on the
best authority, indeed from the Justice himself, that despite his
earlier criticisms of the law clerks, Mr. Justice Rehnquist now em
ploys the maximum allotment of three. And each prepares memo
randa on certiorari petitions and assists in the drafting of opinions.12
It appears there is no escape from resort to the clerkship institution
in aid of the judicial process whenever the press of the case load
leans heavily on the judge.
II.

UP FROM "SECRETARY": THE HISTORY AND ETIOLOGY OF THE
CLERKSHIP INSTITUTION
We begin with the calmer, less colorful historical question:

9. Brudney & Wolfson, Mr. Justice Rutledge-Law Clerks' Refiections, 25 IND. L.J. 455,
456 (1949). I received similarly limited instructions as Judge Gillis's clerk. He simply called
me into chambers, handed me the file containing the briefs on appeal, directed me to the
record in the case, and said that I was
10.

to prepare a

draft opinion by the end of the week.

For its content and the curriculum of the first Law Clerk Institute see the Appendix

to this article.
11.

Typically, "lwlhen the law clerk first assumes his duties, much time is spent

developing the skills necessary for the job."
AI.A. LAW. 155. 157 (1972).
12.

I...etter from .Justice William

Fite,

Rehnquist

Law Clerkships-Three Inside Views, 33

to Paul

R.

Baier, Aug. 24, 1972.
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When and where did the law clerk originate? Why has the office
acquired its present institutional status? What accounts for the
importance of the institution to judicial administration?
Most of what is known about the history of law clerks, at least
those serving the United States Supreme Court, was traced during
the nineteen sixties by Chester Newland, a political scientist and
student of the Supreme Court. Professor Newland's article "Per
sonal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks," pub
lished in the Oregon Law Review in 1961,13 represents that decade's
most comprehensive study of the clerkship as an important aspect
of the judicial process in our nation's foremost tribunal. Perhaps
unwittingly, the article represents a scholarly response to Mr. Jus
tice Rehnquist's earlier call for an impartial study of the clerkship
institution.1t However, as is almost universally true of the various
surveys of the law clerks, Professor Newland's work is confined to
tracing the emergence of the clerkship in the Supreme Court of the
United States. While it is important to examine law clerking at this
pre-eminent level, it can be said with some assurance that not all
clerking is like that experienced by Supreme Court law clerks. Our
inquiry, particularly our focus on the duties of the law clerks, must
be broader and should include clerking as practiced at both inter
mediate and final appellate tribunals throughout the country. Any
description of the clerkship function limited to the personal assist
ants of Supreme Court Justices is too narrow to suit our purposes.
The Institute is national in scope, and the shape of law clerking may
vary considerably as we pass from the Supreme Court to state courts
of last resort and to state intermediate appellate tribunals. None
theless, for purposes of historical analysis, it is easier to focus on the
Supreme Court because of the availability of the National Archives
and other historical sources. 15
A.

History

A safe estimate is that almost 100 years have elapsed since law
clerks were first employed by Supreme Court Justices. Professor
Newland16 and others17 attribute clerkship at this highest level of the
13.

40 ORE. L. REV. 299 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Newland!. I have relied heavily

upon Professor Newland's article for the historical development of the clerkship institution.

14.

See text accompanying note 5 supra.

15.

See Newland, supra note 13, at 299 n. •.

16.

See id. at 305-06.
G APPEALS 321 (1960):
See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDIN
PROCEDURES 119
,J. SCHMIDHA USER THE SUPREME COURT: !Ts POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, AND

17.

'
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judiciary to Justice Horace Gray, who ascended to the bench in
1882. Gray came to the Supreme Court from M assachusetts, where
he served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, and where
in that capacity he b egan the practice of employing an honor gradu
ate of the Harvard Law School at his own expense as "secretary."
Thus, apparently, the clerkship owes its earliest appellation, "secre

tary," to the term inology of Justice Gray .18 This was in 1875, and if
these dates are correct, what has emerged as the institution of law

clerking is almost a century old.
The practice of hiring a young law graduate to serve as secre
tary, of changing the clerk annually, and of making him a responsi
ble participant in the office aspects of the judiciary was continued
by Justice Holmes, who succeeded Gray, and by Justice Frank
furter. Professor Llewellyn ranks it as Frankfurter's greatest contri
bution to our law that "his vision, en ergy, and pers uasiveness
turned this two-judge idiosyncrasy into what shows high possibility
of b ecoming a pervasive American legal institution. "19
In the century that has passed, the law clerk has evolved in
name as well as in substance. One might describe this evolution as
"up from 'secretary , ' " for the law clerk, after escaping Justice
Gray 's initial characterization , h a s been relabeled periodically,
passing from secretary to the more attractive "law clerk," "law
assistant," "research aide," and "legal assistant. "20 Wisconsin calls
its clerks "law exam iners."21 There is, however, occasional slippage
on this point: consider the designation "brief reader. "22
By statute, the term "law clerk" is a secure characterization i n
the federal courts, a n d it i s this term that i s generally utilized t o
describe the office today. Although historically the first official ref( 1960): S . Wu.LISTON. LIFE AND LAW 87 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Wn.LISTONI.
18. See Newland. supra note 13, at 301 n.5.
19. K. LLF.WF.LLYN, supra note 17. at 321.
20. See AMF.RICAN .JUDICATURE SOCIETY, tau· Clerks in State Appellate Courts, Rep. No.
1'1, at .J. 8 (1968).
21. Wis. STAT. AN N . § 251.04(6) (1971).
22.

The quest ion just what to call the law clerk has always been troublesome. The terms

"secretary'" and "clerk" suggest a typist or file clerk, and at one time there may have been

g<l(>cl reason

to

use this designation since the tasks in the beginning were indeed on the

secretarial side. However, as the institution matured in the tasks assigned it, the designation
"rlerk" hecame a misnomer i�taken too literally. This would often require the young graduate
to explain the substance of his first employment, at least to his parents, lest they think that
the past :1 �·ears had produced a file clerk, not an attorney. As a result, we have been told
nne state changed the designation from law clerk to "briefing attorney" to satisfy its clerks'

request for a little more prestige Johnson, What [)() /,aw Clerks Do? 22 TEXAS B.J. 229
( l�li>!l) A fair inference is that a similar purpose underlay the various ch�nges in terminology
.

·

dl·srrihe<l in the text.

•
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erence to the office was in terms of "stenographic clerk,"23 the
United States Code authorizes appointment by the Justices of "law
clerks and secretaries whose salaries shall be fixed by the Court. "2�
Thus the dichotomy between the law side and the clerical side, even
the term "law clerk" itself, is frozen in the pages of the Federal
Code. Interestingly enough, in explaining just what it is that Su
preme Court clerks do, one former clerk points out that this entry
in the Code carries the distinction of never having been construed
by the very judiciary the institution serves. 25
At first blush it might appear significant to one acquainted
with the traditions of judicial administration that the law clerk's
genesis has been attributed to Horace Gray while he sat as Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The office of
chief justice has always been considered responsible for innovations
in the internal opera ting procedures of the court, 26 and it would
seem natural that a chief justice should be the one responsible for
introduction of the law clerk as an aid to the justices. Such is not
the history of it, however, and the truth of the matter shatters the
cynic's notion that those interested in efficient judicial administra
tion are always incompetent as jurisprudes.27 I for one would have
thought it highly unlikely that John Chipman Gray, Harvard's cele
brated legal philosopher,28 would have contributed anything toward
improving the administration, as well as the abstraction, of justice.
But history has it that it was Gray the philosopher who passed to
2:J.

dry

Congress first authorized clerical assistants for Supreme Court Justices in the Sun

Civil Act of Aug. 4, 1886. The Act provided "for stenographic clerk for the Chief Justice

each associate justice of the Supreme Court, at not exceeding one thousand six
hundred dollars each .. . " 24 Stat. 254 (1886). This first authorization was in response to
Attorney General A.H. Garland's request to Congress in his Annual Report of 1885 that the
and for

.

.Justices be given clerical assistance because of the press of the Court's judicial business. See
Newland, supra note 13, at 301.

24.

28 U.S.C.

judges was

§

675 (1970).Provision for law clerks for United States Courts of Appeals

made in 1930, 46 Stat. 774 (1930), as amended, 28 U.S.C.

§

712 (1970), and for
§ 752

United States District Court judges in 1936, 49 Stat. 1140, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
( 1970).

25.

Johnson, supra note 22, at 229.

26. The work of the late Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme
Court is the paradigm. Among Vanderbilt's many writings on judicial reform see T HE CHAL

LENGE OF LAW REFORM (1955) and MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS TRA TION ( 1949). For
details concerning other renowned chief judges and their work toward improving judicial
administration see JUS TICE IN THE STATES: ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THF. JUDICIARY, Mar. 11-14, 1971, at x-xii, and Pringle, The Role of the State Chief Justice.

id. at 80. See generally Burton, Judging l� Also Administration, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 77 (194i).
27. For the origin of this word see K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRA MBLE USH 10 (1960): ..
28. Professor Gray is best known for the first systematic exposition of legal pos1t1v1sm
in this country. See, e.g., J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE l...Aw (1909).

�

VANDERBILT LA W REVI E W

1132

[Vol. 26

his half brother, Chief Justice Horace, the thought of using a young
law graduate as legal secretary. 29
B.

Et iology

There is one tenet of j u d i c i a l ad ministration t h a t rem ains
straight and true when measured against the growth of law clerking.
The etiology of the clerkship-the origin of the institution in terms
of its causes-again proves the truth of John Frank's observation in
Marble Palace, his classic biography of the Supre m e Court: "As the
work load increases, the methods must be strea m l ined or else the
work output will go down. "30 The clerkship represents the judiciary's
response, initially fortuitous, to the press of the cases; it is applica
tion of the principle of division of labor to the judicial process-an
application from which there has been no escape, even for Justice
Rehnquist. For better or worse, the clerkship has proved the invari a 
ble, now deliberate, response t o t h e growth o f appellate c a s e loads
throughout the country. 31
Consistent with this etiological thesis, one would guess that
around 1882, the date Justice Gray first used law clerks, the Su
preme Court of the United States began to experience the case load
brunt of the new industrial growth occurring toward the end of the
nineteenth century . A second look at Marble Palace and Frank's
data proves the guess right. When the Suprem e Court first met in
1790 there were no law clerks , nor was there any need for them. The

first Supreme Court, Frank tells us, had nothing to d o ; it adjourned.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, however, vital changes
occurred . The country expanded to its present national borders and
increased its population and commerce enormously. And the busi
ness of the Supreme Court expanded with the growing country. The
Court began to encounter a real demand on its time about 1850. It
reached a point of full production and became swamped by about
1875, when it was producing something like 200 opinions a year and

could not keep up with the flood of new work.32 From the data it
29.
30.

See WILLISTON, supra note 17, at 87.

J. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 113 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as FRANK].
31. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Accommodating
the Workload of the United States
Courts of Appeals: Report of Recommendations 2
(1968); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
SoLUTio�s FOR APPELLATE CouRT CONGESTION AND
DELAY, Infor. Sheet No. 24, at 7-8 (1963);
Breen, Solutions for Appellate Court Congestion,
47 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 228, 230 (1964); Lum
bar , Current Problems of the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. REY. 29, 39 (1968)
(Chief Judge Lumbard calls for more law clerks
at the federal interme diate appellate level
m response to alarming growth in the case
loads).
32. FRANK, supra note 30, at 12, 288.

�
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appears the introduction of the law clerk in the early 1880's was no
historical accident; rather the clerkship sprang up as the Court's
own protective response to its burgeoning docket. In this regard, it
is significant that Attorney General Garland's 1885 Report to Con
gress contains the first official m ention of clerkship assistance for
the Supreme Court Justices, together with criticisms of the delay
present in the transaction of the High C ourt's business and with a
plea for remedial m easures. To quote Garland:
I believe it would greatly facilitate the business of the Supreme Court if
each justice was provided by law with a secretary or law clerk, to be a stenogra
pher, to be paid an annual salary sufficient to obtain the requisite qualifica
tions, whose duties shall be to assist in such clerical work as might be assigned
to him.'"'

The data of the twentieth century also suggest that an increas. ing case load often requires a change in the method of the Court's
business. This time the change was one of degree, not of kind: hiring
was doub led . Now there were two cle:r;ks, a practice inaugurated in
1941 by Chief Justice Stone in response to further growth in the
.
Court's business.:it By 1947 each Justice was authorized to hire two
law clerks, and again one might correctly guess there was something
peculiar about the case load that year-it was 1947 when in forma
pauperis petitions first began to cause serious problems of docket
management .35 Finally, continued encroachment on the time charts
of the Justices precipitated the most recent change in the policy of
the Court, an a llotment of three law clerks to each Supreme Court
Justice.:i6
Were one to broaden the inquiry to include state courts and
there test these views about the emergence of law clerks, no signifi
cant departure from the federal experience would appear. Recent
figures establish that in those states where case loads are compara
tively small, little use is made of law clerks. Wyoming, for example,
employs none . 37 There are four other states-Maine, Missouri, Ne
braska, and Vermont-whose appellate judges until recently were
also wholly without law clerks.38 None, however, is notorious for any
:n
34.

:l5.
:l6.

1885 Arr'v GEN. ANN. REP. 43.
Newland, supra note 13, at 303.
Id. a t 304.
See Report on the Problems of the Judiciary 2, 10-11, Address by Chief Justice

Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Aug. 14 ' 1972.
.
.
:n. "At this time we have no law clerks, administrators or staff assistance. ,, Letter from
Chief .Justice John J. Mcintyre to Paul R. Baier, Sept. 22, 1972.

:18.

See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, State Court Systems 80-83 (rev. ed. 1970)

I hereinafter c it e d as COUNCILi. Justice Harry A. Spencer of the

ebraska Supreme Court,
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litigious spirit or case load crisis.
Lately other state courts have also incre ased previously mm1mal use of law clerks in response to swelling appellate dockets. For
example, the seven justices of the Kansas Supreme Court have in
creased their staff of clerks from four to nine.:rn Simil arly, the num
ber of clerks serving the Supreme Court of North D akota doubled
in 1971.�° Finally, the need for more clerks has even touched New
Hampshire,41 despite that State's long tradition of independence
exemplified by John Doe, its spirited Chief Justice, who not only
wrote for himself without the help of law clerks, but who also was
quite ready to write for any of his colleagues willing-or impor
tuned-to let him.42
California, on the other hand, le ads the country in the number
of law clerks authorized and serving that State's judicia ry . Over 30
clerks serve the California Supreme Court alone.i:i Of these, approxiwho was at the Law Center as a member o f the Institute's faculty, told me that Nebra�ka
now provides one law clerk for each justice, a practice inaugurated in 1972. The 7 justice$ of
the Supreme Court of Missouri now have one law clerk each. These clerks are employed for
one year at a salary of $10,000. Letter from Chief Justice James A. Finch, .Jr. to Paul R. Baier.
Sept. 26, 1972. The Maine Supreme Court recently has completed a pilot year using law
clerks, and its chief justice hopes the state legislature will continue the practice permanently.
Letter from Chief Justice Armand A. Dufresne, Jr. to Paul R. Baier, Sept. 25, 1972. In
January 1972, 2 law clerks were hired for the 5 justices of the Vermont Supreme Court.
Telephone conversation with Lawrence Turgeon, Court Administrator, Vermont Supreme
Court, Sept. 19, 1972.
39.

The court had 4 clerks as late as 1970. See COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 80. As of Sept.

1, 1972, Kansas had 9 law clerks, one for each of the 7 justices and 2 for court commissioners.
The increase was necessitated by growth in the case load. Interview with Douglas Richards.
law clerk to Justice A.S. Schroeder, Kansas Supreme Court, in Baton Rouge, Aug. 30, 1972;
see

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3122 (1969).
40.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota employed 2 additional law clerks under the

Emergency Employment Act of 1971. Letter from Chief Justice Alvin C. Strutz to Paul R.
Baier, Sept. 25 , 1972.
41. In 1970, New Hampshire's 5 Supreme Court justices shared one law clerk. See
CouNCIL, supra note 38, at 81. The court now has 5 law clerks. Letter from Justice William
A. Grimes to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 23, 1972.
42.

See Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opin ions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L.

REV. 59 (1963). Justice William Grimes of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, who was also
at the Institute as a faculty member, informed me that Doe's "New Hampshire Method" was
still alive and well in Concord:
"What justice requires" is the test of many things in N.H. law; and if the court has
a correct sense of justice, that test is something we need not be
afraid of however
unsatisfact�ry it may be to mathematical and mechanical minds,
and to j�dges who
_
_
want to avoid the cultivat10n
s and laborious use of practical judgment on matters of fact
hy applying a two foot rule taken from the N.H. Reports.

Letter from Charles Doe to Frank Nesmith Parsons Oct. 28
' 1895 , q uot ed m
· 63 COLUM. L.
REV. at fi:l.
,

4;3_

See COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 80. Chief
Justice Donald R. Wright currently em-
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mately half are career employees pursuing a sort of professional
clerkship, 41 b u t that still leaves over two clerks for each of the seven
justices. New York is next with sixteen clerks authorized for the
seven judges of the Court of Appeals.45 In both of these States law
suits are aplenty, and litigation is a way of lif e . Again it seems the
more cases on the docket, the more law clerks . Pennsylvania and
Illinois also rank high on the list, with two clerks for each supreme
court justice. 46
To one convinced that the clerkship's contribution is indeed an
enhancement of the rationality of judgment, all these figures could
easily tempt a devilish inquiry. I for one recall very f ew cases of
moment fro m Kansas or from Wyoming. On the other hand, it
might be fair to draw a favorabl e inf erence about the value of law
clerks from the fact that a l l the great cases in the books are from
New York, or from the pen of California's Traynor-assisted by no
lean comp l e m ent of prof essional and perennial law clerks. I doubt
the number of law clerks has anything at all to do with the quality
of a court's justice. I have my suspicions, however, that it may
affect-and for the better-the quantity,47 indeed even the quality,48
ploys 12 clerks, 8 permanent and 4 yearly appointees. He reports that, "I need them all, and
more!" Telephone conversation with Chief Justice Donald Wright, Oct. 5, 1972.

44.

COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 82 n.d.

45.

Id. at 81.

Id. at 80, 81.
The same conclusion is reached by Judge Winslow Christian in Using Prehearing
Procedures to Increase Productivity, Panel Discussion before the Section of Judicial Adminis
tration, Appellate Judges Conference, Proceedings of the American Bar Association 93rd
46.

47.

Annual Meeting, Aug. 8, 1970, printed in 52 F.R.D. 55, 60 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Panel
Discussion]:

[T]he way work is organized and staffed does have a weighty impact on the volume
of the court's product. We cannot produce the increased volume of quality work that the
public demands until we teach ourselves, through diligent practice and bold experiment,
new ways of organizing our work. Above all, we must learn to adopt in some cases the
role of staff supervisor. We must learn to save the personal craftsmanship of the judges

for special cases .

.Judge Christian is currently on leave from the California Court of Appeal and is serving
See Reardon, The Ne11•

as Director of the newly established National Center for State Courts.

National Ce nter for State Courts-Progress and Prospects, 55 JUDICATURE 66 (1971).
a
48. See Braden, The Value of /,aw Clerks, 24 Miss. L.J. 295 (1953) ("If a judl{e has
competent. law clerk to help him, his decision ought to be better than would be the case if
is
the judge had to work alone."). But see Christian, supra note 47, at. 60 ("fTlhe way staff
of
view
of
point
the
from
factors
neutral
probably
are
u�ed, and the way cases are assigned,

the (/lia!ity of the decisional process.").

.
own
A former Solicitor General of the United St.ates, Erwin Griswold, has added his
Court opin·
speculation about the effect of law clerks on the length and quality of Supreme
of the work
ions. Arcording to
. Griswold, the law clerks may now in fact perform some
in post·
spent
is
time
more
that
result
the
with
t raclit ionally performed by appellate counsel,
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of that same court's judgmen ts. Perhaps those jurisdic tions with
more law clerks also have better appellat e opinion s . 49 Surely the
question is worthy of research , albeit the task would require its
master to d evise some measure of the quality of a ppellate court

judgments . Until then we are remitted to our own speculations
about these matters; any definitive resolution must await a later
date.

C.

The Nascent Institution

A final aspect of the history of the law clerkship remains for
consideration. It brings us back to the present, to this very confer
ence, for in a significant way the Institute contains its own fair
measure of history . Your participation here manifests a n e w plateau
in the evolution of the law clerk as participant in today's judicial
process.
There has been much use of the word institution to describe the
current status of the law clerks . Much of the writing about them
reflects this usage. Even my title proffers what follows as: "Profile
of an Institution." Yet until this conference an important indicium
of the clerk's institutional maturity was missing. T his Law Clerk
Institute fills the gap. Let me e laborate .
A sociologist would tell us one measures the maturity of an
institution by the social distance that separates its human partici
pants from the functions they serve, the roles they play in society.
Only humorously, says Webster, is an individual considered an in
stitution.50 Literally, and from the Latin, an institution is something
that has set in, a practice that is a persistent element of the life of
an organized social group . Take the judiciary for example. It is easy
for one unsteeped in the law to think of a judge or court anonyargument research and discussion. Does this, he asks, in tum "[lead]
to longer opinions
because of th � �kill and zeal with which points are raised-and perhaps
even [lead] to more
d1ssentmg opm1ons and concurring opinions?" Griswold, Appellate
Advocacy, 26 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 354 ( 19 71 ).
49. "If th � appellate judge is at all pressed for time, the
presence of a compete nt clerk
may spell the difference between sloppy and workmanlike opinions
." Braden ' supra note 48
at 296.
Professor Carrington has made the point, however,
that there is a danger in going over
.
board here. It would e possible to equip a single judge
with a very large staff so that he could
then manage the entITe appellate business of the federal
courts. And it is likely that such an
opera tion ':" ould produce �ery craftsm�nlike decisio
ns. But at what cost? Professor Carrington
.
.
descnhes 1t as a loss of . the humanistic empha
sis on the 1n
· d'1v1'dua) ' s roIe m
,,
· the JU
· l
· d'1cia
.
process . Carrington, The Dangers of Judicial
D elegation: Concluding Remark.� Panel Dis.
'
cuss1011, m 52 F.R.D. 76, 78.
.')O. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1288 (2d ed. 1936).
'

?
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mously. Yet to our legal minds the expression "judge" conj ures up
Lord Mansfield, Holmes, or Cardozo-maybe even M usmanno. To
a sociologist these are all personalities. The man is not the office.
And, as it matures, it is the office that comes to have identifiable
characteristics a l l its own. Such a step occurred in the evolution of
the judge as an institution when the early Italian cities first chose
their adjudica tors from the outside, from other cities, in order to
secure the obje ctive i mpartiality of a stranger. 51 Similarly, an insti
tution's growth can a l so be measured by its trappings, by all the
froufrou that surrounds it and interposes the necessary distance
between social perform ance and personality. Recall that John Frank
titled his institutiona l study of the Supreme Court not by reference
to any of its personalities, but to its marble.52
To contin u e for the moment with the j udge, this country's first
se minar for appellate j udges was conducted at New York Univer
sity's School of Law in the summer of 1956.53 Again, this is all
froufrou, a lthough as its Director, Professor Robert Leflar, pointed
out, "[ijt was a working seminar. "54 Yet for our purposes the idea
of a seminar for j udges is significant because it reflects the institu
tion of judge, qua judge-apart from the man that is. The goal was
better performance of the judicial function, not the improvement of
personality. 55
So it is with the Law Clerk Institute, an event Louisiana State
University hopes to continue in the tradition of the Appellate
Judges S eminar. With it-and to complete the history-the clerk
ship as an institution has come of age.
Ill.

SELECTION, TENURE, AND SALARY
A.

Selection

It used to be the tradition, at least for the Supreme Court of
the United States, that law school professors would recommend to
Justices who were personal friends the young men chosen as clerks.56
51. G. SIMMEL, THE SocJOLOGY OF GEORG S1MMEL 404 (K. Wolff tra nsl. 1950).
52. In MARBLE PALACE Frank also makes explicit this social dichotomy between the man
and his office: "[A]ny good Justice maintains not merely an individual but also an i nstitutional sense." FRANK, supra note 30, at 260; see id. at 143.
.
9 J.
fi:l. See generally Leflar, The Appellate Judges Seminar at New York Un wers1.ty,
LF:GAL Eo. 359 (1956).
.

54.

fifi.
19()!')).
56.

Id.
L. REV. 370
SeP Leflar, Continui ng Education for Appellate Judges, 15 BUFFALO
te Courts in the
Ser WILLISTON, supra note 17, at 87; Dorsen, Law Clerks in Appella
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Often, as in the case of Harvard's Williston, these professors had
themselves served this same Justice at one time as law clerk. Willis
ton clerked for Horace Gray, who initiated the clerkship practice in
the Supreme Court.57 Holmes, succeeding Gray, continued to accept
the recommendations of John Chipman Gray, Horace's half brother
and professor . Later Holmes used Frankfurter to appoint his
clerks. 58 One of Professor Frankfurter's selections was Barton Leach,
who served Justice Holmes in 1925. Like Williston before him, secre
tary Leach was later to become a law professor, and, happily as it
turned out, Leach proved one of Harvard's finest wits, in both senses
of the word. To him we owe one of the better published reminis
cences about law clerking.59
There were other, less savory means of selection, however. On
occasion a Justice hired his own son, or the son of a fellow Justice.
The first Harlan, for instance, chose his son John Maynard Harlan,
father of the second Justice Harlan, as law clerk.60 However, from
what I know of Harlan opinions, both those of the first and of the
second-they are always quite good-all this only proves the wis
dom of Machiavelli's advice to the Prince about hiring good secre
taries: "The first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains

is from seeing the men that he has about him . " 6 1

Ordinarily the selection criteria for the position require the pro
spective clerk to have graduated at or near the top of his law school
class, and because of the nature of the tasks to be performed , there
has emerged a preference for graduates with law review experience
or some comparable research and writing while in law school . 62
Sometimes the idiosyncrasies of a particular judge i mpose addi
tional requirements . Professor Newland's article reports that Jus
tice McReynolds, for instance, was plagued with troubles in locating
and retaining his clerks because he made it a requirement of the
office that his secretaries remain single and that they refrain from
using tobacco while on the job . 63 Other judges are not such marti
nets. Justice Black preferred clerks who could play a good game of
l !nited 8tatr"'· 26 MODERN L. REV. 265, 266 ( 1963); Hills, A Law
I !11it1•d States, 33 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 333 n.4 ( 1 958) .

of the

Clerk a t

the Supreme

'17.

Sr•r• W11.1.1STON . supra note 17, at 87.

'1H.
'1!l.

Sci• Newland, supra note 13, at 306.
l ea('h, lfrcol/1•cti11ns rif a Holmes Secretary,
1941 HARV. L. SCHOOL BULL. 1 2 .
'.
.'i1·1· Newlan d, supra note 1 3 , a t 306.
N . MAClllAVF.l.1.1, THE PRINCE 1 14 ( Mento
r ed. Ricci transl. 1952).
" 1•r• ,....OlfNC ll., supra note 38. at 82-8:
l nn.c,k ,w, ai.
:-.lr•wlnn <l, supra note 1:1. at :l06-07.

60.
61.
6'J.
-

6:1.

.
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tennis , m arried or not . 'il Nevertheless, no j udge, I am sure, would
approve the nasty habit of work ing with one's shoes off, even with
feet tucked carefully beneath a desk crowded with the reports. I was
once called to task for that. S o mehow I just think better with my
shoes off. I qu ickly c h anged my ways though, after Chief Judge
Lesinski re m inded me in no laconic fashion of the adage that it is
important t hat j ustice appear to be done. This almost tem pted an
other of those c urious inquiries, but the Chief Judge quickly added
was his court . That was enough for me although later re

that it

search proved that Justice, at least all the statuary I observed,
stands barefoot as well as blindfolded. 65
Further personal preference may confine a judge i n his selection
to one law school or to a parti cular geographical area. Justices Gray,
Holmes, and Brandeis relied exclusively on Harvard for their clerks .
In the main so d i d Frankfurter after ascending the bench. Similarly,
other law schools have h a d the good fortune of having "their Jus
tice" on the Supreme Court. E ach year Chief Justice Taft took his
clerks from Yale at the recom mendation of its then Dean Charles
E. Clark. M i chigan was the favorite of Justice Murphy; Minnesota
was the source of Justice Butler's clerks. Justice Vinson favored
Northwestern, a n d Justice Minton relied on Indiana. Often these
favorites with the Justi ces were the schools they themselves had
attended.6n
Appoi n t m e n t on the basis of the j udge 's geographical back
ground is also com monpl ace . At the Supreme Court Justice Douglas
has favored appointees from the West Coast, Justice Black more
often than not selected southerners as his clerks, and Justice Whit
taker selected his clerks from the M idwest.67
At the state level there is, as one would expect, a tendency for
the judges to select their clerks from local law schools. A prominent
local school often finds appellate judges of the home state particu
larly willing to hire its top graduates, although not required to do
so. In Michigan the situation is probably typical. During the year
64. See FRANK, supra note 30, at 1 1 6.
Supreme
6fi. I have hanging in my office a photograph of the facade of the Unit�d States
he steps
t
t
ad1acent
column
marble
large
Court. that. depicts Themis herself sitting atop a
of the Court . This photo clearly shows a rather large naked toe and bare foot JUt.lm g out f rom
.
on a
under her gown. Yet she is not even studying the reports. For those wh � would insist
TION OF
COMPILA
in
more form al citation Themis 's foot is similarly displayed au nature/
STATES CAPITOL 289 ( U . S . Gov. Pri n t · Office
.

;

WORKS OF ART AND O HER OBJECTS IN THE UNITED

1 !>6!i ) .
66.
67.

See Newland, supra note 13, at 308.
S<'e id. at 309.

o
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just ended, of that State's twenty law clerks for both its Supreme
Court and its Court of Appeals, eighteen were from M ic h igan law
schools, including the Universities of Michigan and Detroit, Wayne
State, and the Detroit College of Law. Sometimes a j udge will buck
the local schools and opt for a graduate of a national law school. The
two remaining clerks in Michigan last year were from Yale and
Northwestern. 68 Where the judge is fortunate enough to have two
clerks, he will often split the difference.
Little i s known about the mechanics of selection in the state
courts, although the latest national survey of state court systems
provides some general information. In most states law clerks are
selected by individual judges, but the specific criteria and require
ments are unknown . In my own case I just happened across a letter
soliciting a clerk posted on a special bulletin board at the l aw school .
Most law school placement offices maintain a file of clerkship solici
tations.
In some states the court as a whole selects the clerks through a
special procedure or agency. In Maryland, for instance, the court ' s
administrative office first interviews prospective clerks . In Massa
chusetts a single justice screens all the clerkship candidate s . An
other jurisdiction, after group selection for the court as a whole,
follows the practice of assigning the clerks to individual judges by
lot. Some j urisdictions use a committee of judges appointed by the
chief judge to interview prospective clerks and to m ak e recommen 
dations to the entire court .69 Judge Lesinski' s court in M ic hi gan has
an extensive recruitment program designed to solicit clerks from
across the nation. Each year a committee of the judges personally
interviews candidates throughout M ichigan, and a special trip is
68.

Letter from Robert Avery, Research Attorney, Pre-Hearing Division, Michigan.

Court of Appeals, to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 28, 1972.
The situation in Michigan, however, might be regarded as exceptional b y some, espe

cially University of Michigan law alumni. No denigration i s intended since I put Michiga n
in the "national" category-whatever that is. No doubt Michigan alumni would prefer that
Ohio be taken as illustrative. Accordingly, in Ohio last year the 8th District Court of Appeal s
judges selected their clerks from Case-Western, Cleveland State, Ohio State, Cornell, and
Wisconsin. Letter from Judge Jack G. Day to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 25, 1972. Judge Day
informed me at the Institute that the absence of Michigan clerks was fortuitous, since each
year his court tries to recruit Michigan graduates as clerks. His own interest in good j udging ,
I was t old, "rises above all that nonsense alumni rivalry ." And, I would add, Judge Day's
present ation at the conference proved him hardly a man interested exclusively in football .
.Judge Day was the Institute's resident jurisprude, tendering to the clerks his thoughts on

" L ogic and .Judicial Reasoning." Very heavy stuff indeed.
69. -"<'<' Co11NCIL, supra note 38, Table XIV, at 83 nn.j,l,n,p.
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made to the East Coast as wel l . 711 Finally, one jurisdiction selects its
clerks on the reco m m endations of a law school placement board.11

B.

Tenure

The brevity of the clerkship is one of its institutional character
istics. n The tradition is for a short ter m , usually one year. And there
is the view that this period is purposefully short, allowing fresh
blood to circulate anew each year in the judiciary. The idea is that
with the rapid turnover the j udges are kept in touch with what is
happening at the law schools-doctrinally, that is.73 Equally impor
tant , with each n e w cub of independent spirit the judge obtains all
the enthu siasm and zeal the young graduate brings to his first job .
Karl Llewellyn puts i t this way :
[T]he recurring and unceasing impact of a young junior in the task is the best
medicine yet discovered by man against the hardening of a senior's mind and
imagination . .
"A new model every year" may have little to commend it
.

.

in the matter of appliances or motorcars or appellate judges, but it has a great
deal to offer in the matter of appellate judges' clerks; there then arrives yearly
in the judge's cha mbers a reasonable sampling of information and opinion
derived from the labors, over the three past years, of an intelligent group of
men specializing i n the current growth and problems of our law: the faculty
which has reared the new apprentice. This is a time-cheap road to stimulus
and to useful lea d s . ;J
70.

Interview with N. Otto Stockmeyer, Director of the Michigan Pre-Hearing Division,

in Baton Rouge, Aug. 29, 1972. Mr. Stockmeyer was also on the faculty of the Institute.

71.

See COUNCIL, supra note 38, Table XIV, at 83 n.s. Another member of the faculty,

Judge Robert T. Mann o f the Florida Court of Appeal, 2d District, informed me that it was
his practice to hire clerks on the recommendation of University of Florida Law School profes 
sors.
72.

"The law clerks are the only employees of the Supreme Court for whom a tradition

of short-term employment has developed. The one-year terms common for clerks today are
in contrast to the distinguishing concept of continuity that attaches to everything else about
the court . " Newland, supra note 13, at 305. See also id. at 3 1 6.
73.

"A recent graduate from law school is, to be sure, innocent in the practical way of

the law, but he is also likely to be learned in what may be called the frontiers of the law, the
new ideas being evolved in the halls of the scholars of the law. The law develops, as it must
if it is to meet the needs of a changing society, and the judges who pronounce the law need
all the help that they can get in keeping the law abreast of the times . " Braden, supra note
48, at 297; see text accompanying note 4 supra.

I wonder whether there is not room for the law clerk to keep his judge in touch with what
is ha ppening literally too. See People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 ( 1 972);
People

v.

Sinclair, 387 Mich. 9 1 , 194 N.W.2d 878 ( 1 972) ; FRANK, supra note 30, at 149-50:

"How t.o keep Justices appointed for life themselves in tune with the throbbing life of the
American people and to prevent their becoming remote high priests of a mysterious ritual
has concerned some of the best minds in the country since 1790." Frank mentions the aban

doned practice of circuit riding for the Justices and also social gatherings. ld. at !iiO, l li2.
But the law clerk is not mentioned as a possible conduit of the Zeitgeis t.

74.

K . LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 322.
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While the tradition of yearly appointment promotes the infu 
sion of new ideas and vigor into the judicial process, the time -drain
of breaking in a n ew clerk each year must be reckoned with. One
way is the practice of having the retiring clerk inform his successor
of the ways of the office. This Institute represents a second , more
concerted e ffort in the same direction. There is nothing quite like
actually doing the job, however, and thus a natural tension exists
between the ideal of a short term and an interest in retaining the
experienced clerk. It seems a particularly wasteful scheme to em 
ploy a clerk for only one year, for at the very moment he steps down
he has his best fe el for the art . It would appear more efficient to
continue the clerk for another year,75 and another-perhaps even
permanently.
Some clerks remain on for quite some tim e . Justice McKenna's
first clerk was with him for twelve years, until the clerk's death.
There are also cases in which an enduring tenure is finally ended
by the death of the judge , rather than the clerk. One of Butl er's
clerks worked for sixteen years until the Justice's de ath in 1939. 7r.
Clearly some tradeoff is necessary between efficiency and the
advantages of yearly rehire. It was Chief Justice Stone who inaugu
rated the practice of overlapping terms for his two clerks , m aking
one the "senior," the other the "junior" law clerk . The senior was
always a carryover junior, who was then allowed to test his experi
ence against a second year, serving at the same time as m e ntor for
his junior.77 In the state courts the line is usually drawn at the end
of the first year, and in most jurisdictions today the l aw clerk serves
for one year.7R
A further tradition is t h a t the clerk's tenure runs with the
judge, not with the office . Justice Holmes once referred to this in a
letter confirming the appointment of one of his clerks. S aving the
Governm ent harmless from suit, Holmes quipped at the end , " I
assume you realize that I reserve the right to die or resign . "79

C.

Salary

What about salary? How much is the other fellow m aking? This
7'1.

However, "lwl hat the judge gains in ease of administra tion h e
loses in quality of

78.

CouNr. 11.. wpra note 38, Table XIV, at 80-82.
Leach, supra note 59, at 13.

service. " Rraden, supra note 48, at 298.
7o. S<'e Newland, supra note 13, at 307.
77. S1•e id. at :!04.
79.
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is another of t h ose top ics somehow inherently capable of rousing

interest . In C a l i forn i a in 1 972 some of the other fellows were drawing

so
30, 564 dol lars a y ear . Surely this is the type of pronouncement that
pushes you off your s e a t as well as toward the edge. But these are

the career clerks , t h e permanent " Principal Attorneys" who work in
the Ca lifo rn ia system . s t A safe guess for law clerks in the traditional
sense is t h a t t hey e a rn between 10,000 and 15,000 dollars for their
year with the court . Anything more specific I would leave to other
authors, for t h e rewards I am interested in detailing have nothing
to do wit h m o n ey

.

IV.

D UTIES 82

We reach that favorite question of these surveys : What do law
clerks do?s:i Undoubtedly the question will be put to you at least
once during your clerkship by some curious interlocutor. Perhaps by
80.

Letter from Ralph N. Kleps, Court A d ministrator, California Supreme Court, to

Paul R. Baier, Oct. 1 9 , 1 97 2 . This represents an increase of $4,416 since

1970.

See CouNCIL,

supra note :38, Table XIV, at 80.
8 1 . See CouNctL, supra note 38, Table XIV, at 82 n . d .
82. Those who have written o n the clerkship often point out that because o f t h e confi
dential nature of the job it is difficult accurately to discuss the scope of the duties of the clerk.
Professor \:ewland notes: "Because of the confidential nature of the court's inner operations,
it is i m possible to describe the duties of the clerks in exacting detail . " Newland, supra note
1:3, at :ll t n .36. Newland attributes the lack of information to the confidentiality of the
position, quoting .Justice Brandeis's instructions to his clerk Louis Jaffe: "He once told m e
t h a t I was never t o let anyone know what we were working o n , not even the secretaries of the
other .Just ices . " Id. But it m ight be asked whether a distinction can be drawn between the
tasks of clerking a n d the q u estions under j udicial consideration-something like the
proced ure-substance dichotomy. That is to say, why should confidentiality of things sub
judice close the mouths of the clerks as to the nature of their job? Judge Medina of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has asked the same question: "Why is this? Are we all living in a
world of sham 'I Is there some point in pretense or illusion, all in the cause of the dignity of
the courts9 .
. And so I ask the question: thus working together is it possible that m y law
clerk has no influence on my views of the law? I think it is not possible; of course he has some
influe nce on the decisional process in which I participate; and that is the very reason I have

hi m as my law clerk. Why deny it?" Medina, Some Refiections on the Judicial Function at
/hf! A ppellate Level, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 148, 154, 155.
I suspect the low visibil ity of the clerk's duties in the literature is not a product of the
conlid entiality of the case load itself. Rather, an interest in preserving the symbolism of the
judicial office is at work here. The traditional image is one of the judge working alone without
the aid of any staff, and probably those faithful to the judicial process share the view th at
_
this image should be m a intained in the public's eye. See Carrington, The Danl{ers of Judll'lal
8,
/Je/<'gation: Concluding Remarks, Panel Discussion, Am. Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, Aug.
H J70, !i2 F' . R . D . 76, 78. As a consequence, confiden tiality of the case load engulfs t he p:ocess
of decisio n-making as well, including the role of the law clerks, in order to mamtam t he
appearance of "individualized justice."
8:3. See. e.g. , Johnson, Wha t D O Law Clerks Do ? , 22 TEXAS B.J. 229 ( ! 9!i9l .
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then you will have accumulated enough of your own personal experi
ence to provide an answer ; maybe you will even d e cide to record a
formal response in the local bar j ournal . I would encourage the
practice. There is too little hard data about this distinctly American
institution, 8� and much of what we do know about p erformance of
the clerkship function comes from the personal reminiscences of
former clerks. At least take the time toward the end of your clerk
ship to return the Institute's questionnaire about the matter. We
intend to improve the Institute's program in the future and, hope
fully, to extrapolate some consensus from your responses about the
most efficient way a judge can use his clerk.
But to return to our interlocutor, the short answer is that given
by one former clerk: You provide a second pair of hands and legs
for your j udge.85 There are reports to retrieve and lots of bags to tote.
Further, I would add that you also tender a second mind, although
there is some controversy about this .86 You should find the next year
filled with much collaborative thinking between you and your j udge .
Law clerking, at least law clerking at its best, requires much conver
sation and hard thinking between judge and clerk. 87 I recall such a
84 .

In England there are no law clerks. There is a very good reason, however, since "law

clerks" in the American tradition would have nothing to do in England. Typically, English
a ppeals are submitted without briefs and most judgments are rendered extemporaneously
from the bench immediately after oral argument. Thus there would be n o research or writing
for the clerk to do. There are, however, a group of barristers who perform some of the funct.ions
accomplished by American law clerks. These are the law reporters, who are responsible for
checking the citations and improving the language in any opinions that are published in the
Law Reports. See D . K ARLEN, APPELLATE CouRTs

( 1963 ) .
85.

IN

THE UNI TED S TATES AND ENG LAND 1 4 5

FRANK, supra note 30, at 1 16.

One former clerk notes that it may very well be a pervasive view among the Bar
that 2 heads are better than one except when one of the heads is fresh out of law school.
Illustrative of such a view is the following, quoted in Braden, supra note 4 7, at 295: " O f
86.

course, i t m a y b e that we are getting t o the point where we have t o have a certain number of
law clerks, but I think most counsel feel that they would like to argue before the judge who
is hearing the case, and not have it decided by some young fellow out of law school, any more
than we can help." Similarly, Justice Tom Clark has remarked: "[D)uring my 10 years on
the Court I have been asked by prominent lawyers, who should know better, to please speak
to my law clerks about their petitions." Clark, Internal Operation of the United State
s

Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. Jun. Soc'v 45, 48 ( 1959 ) .
87. "Discussion o f a case serves t o clarify a man's thoughts, and a clerk c a n
b e o f great
value to a judge by asking pointed questions, posing alternatives, and generally
acting as a
devil's advocate. The net result of this sort of collaboration may be that
the law as handed
down differs in some respect from what would be the case were there no
clerk with whom to
di scuss the case. But this is no reason to oppose clerks, for the law as handed
down may differ
i f a judge engages in a greater or lesser amount of research
. . . . " Braden supra note 48 at

29G.

'

'
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m oment, d uring a long drive back to Detroit from Grand Rapids,
M ichi gan , where my j u dge h a d just heard a week of oral argument.
I proved a poor cha u ffeur. We were in the quick, the left lane of the

Interstate ; so m e how my efforts at verbal collaboration got the best
of me . Although he willingly encouraged an exchange of views on
other occasions, J udge Gillis finally interrupted me this time and
asked whether i t was possible for me to drive faster than 40 miles

per hour. Not only d o I think better with my shoes off, but it seems
I tend to do a b etter job with my foot off the gas pedal as wel l .
You shou l d also find t h i s thinking b etween judge a n d clerk
somehow follows you home from the office and envelops an evening.
A good j udge uses his clerk as sounding board to test the roots of
judgment. In turn, sometimes a clerk will discuss the matter with
another clerk, or on return home from the office he will use his wife
as his own Confidential to test his latest efforts.88 All of this is meant
in the end to assure that the judge's yea or nay is cast as close to
the mark as possibl e .

A.

Rem iniscences

I have mentioned that one obtains a fairly decent picture of the
duties of a law clerk from the personal reflections of former clerks.
I should like to add my own account in a moment, together with
some com men tary about the influence of a court's operating proce
dure on the shape of a clerk's duties . What you will do next year
Perhaps the best description in the literature of the ideal relationship between judge and
clerk is that of Professor Philip Kurland, who served Judge Jerome N. Frank : "With Frank
there was never a question of your working for him ; you always worked with him. There was
a job to be done which needed the best efforts of both and, so far as he was concerned, your
contrih ution was a s essential as his." Kurland, Jerom e N. Frank: Some Reflections and
Recollections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 , 662-63 (1957).
88.

I owe the a llusion t o Professor Benjamin Kaplan. See Kaplan, A n A m erican Lawyer

in the Queen 's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69 M1cH. L. REV. 82 1 , 846
( 1 97 1 ) .
I owe some substantive criticism to Mary Lou Crowley, law clerk to Judge Frank Del
Vecc hio, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. She put the question to me whether
it was appropriate for a clerk to discuss his work with his fellows, or even his wife, in light of
t he confidential nature of the job. I had to confess that perhaps my remarks were too loose;

and, indeed, later research disclosed that some judges explicitly instruct their clerks not t o
discuss their work with anyone, including their wives. See note 8 2 supra. I n turn, I p u t t he
quest ion to ,Justice Albert Tate of the Louisiana Supreme Court, who spoke on t he et hies of
t he clerks h i p
Justice Tate was of the view that so long as t he confiden t ia l

at the Institute.
nat ure of t.he discussion i s u nderstood b y both parties, there i s nothing wrong with a n e x 
('hange of ideas between clerks about cases currently pending before the court , or wi t h nn
e
afte r-office dialogue between husband and wife , often unavoidable anyway. Telephon con-

versa tion with .Justice Albert Tate, Sept. 22, 1972.
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depends to some extent on where you are going a n d how your court
conducts its judicial business. First, however, it is expedient and
instructive to quote from some of these recorded reflecti ons.
Samuel Williston described his work for Justice Gray in his
autobiography

Life and Law as follows :

. . . My task was to aid Judge Gray in his preparation of cases to be voted
on at the consultation on the ensuing Saturday, and i n his writing of the
opinions that were assigned to him.
. . . When he returned from court each day he would hand me the records
and briefs of any cases in which the arguments had been completed, and would
tell me to look over these "novelettes," as he called the m , and see what I
thought of them . This I would do, often being compelled to work in the evening
in order to be prepared to make my reports. When I made th e m , the Judge
would question m e to bring out the essential points, and I rarely learned what
he thought of a case until I had been thoroughly cross-exam i ne d . I would also
frequently be asked to write an opinion on the cases that had been assigned
to the Judge . I do not wish, however, to give the impression that my work
served fo r more than a stimulus for the j udge's own mind. He was a careful
man and examined cases for himse lf, and wrote his own opinions ; my work
served only as a suggestion.
It was my duty also to read over the opinions prepared by the other
justices which were passed around in proof to all members of the Court for
criticism before they were ultimately delivered. Courtesy to brother justices
sometimes prevented Judge Gray from making all the criticisms that seemed
to me appropriate, coming, as I had, fresh from law school theorizing.'"

In

Mar b le Palace John Frank wrote about his w ork for Justice

Black:
The tasks of the clerks are also very much the product of the whims of
their Justices. In general, it is the job of the clerk to be eyes and legs for his
judge, finding and bringing in useful materials. This can involve an immense
amount of work, depending upon how curious the Justice is. It is a legend that
Justice Brandeis once asked a clerk to look at every page of every volume of
the United States Reports looking for a particular point. The clerks may also
have semi-social duties, like those who visited with Holmes or took walks with
Stone or played tennis with Black, or superintended the circulation of the
guests at the Brandeis Sunday teas. All of this is in the spirit uf an amiable
relationship between a wise, elderly man and a young cub at the bar.
In respect to the more serious business of the Court, som e of the Justices
use their clerks to summarize the petitions for certiorari, or the applications
to be heard. Other Justices prefer to do this themselves .
The function of the clerks n relation to the writing of the opinions also
.
.
widely.
In the early 1940 s, at least, Justice Black wrote the first draft
vanes
of all his opinions, except that toward the end of the year he would let the
youngster try his hand at one first draft of something extremely unimportant.
In my own case, the day of glory came when I did the first draft of a lone dissent
on � minor point of statutory construction, which the Justice then revised and
w 1ch no o � e has ever noticed since. Sometimes a Justice writes the first draft
.
. the clerk writes the first draft of another, and the opinions
of one opinion while

,i

�

8�J.

W11.1.1STON, supra note 17,

at

9 1 -92.
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are t h en excha �1ged a.nd the clerk writes a second draft of his Justice's opinion
.
while the .J u s t i c e writes a second draft of the clerk's . Sometimes c lerks are
a l lowed to do the b u l k of t h e serious writing for the Justice.
The e x t en t to which ,J ustices use clerks as ghosts is largely unknown
becau se of t h e t ra d i t ional secrecy that surrounds each office. It is known that
.Justice Douglas gives his clerks next to nothing to do in this area, preferring
to keep more of t he office work in his own hands than does any other Justice.
On the o t h e r h a n d , there were rumors that the excellent Clerks of Justice
M u rphy did more of the office writing than was commonly thought proper;
there is no corroboration of this, however, and the style of many Murphy
opinions shows a consistency over the years indicating that they came from
only one h a n d . The most notorious rumors concern Chief Justice Vinson, who
is said to have done all his "writing" with h i s hands in his pockets, outlining
t o his clerks generally what h e wanted, and then criticizing this bit or that in
a

clerk's draft and making suggestions for revision.90

Another of Justice Black's law clerks, now Professor Daniel
Meador of the University of Virginia, adds the following:
As in the other Justices' offices, the clerks get the weekly distribution of cer
tiorari petitions. The task is to prepare a short memorandum on each. Year
round these come on an average of twenty to thirty a week. Besides the "cert
memos , " t h e major work is in the preparation of opinions. Here the clerk's role
is t hat of a com b in ation research assistant, critic, sounding board, and ten
derer of suggestions-occasionally a point of substance but more often matters
of punctuation, p hraseology or organization.
When "the Judge," as his clerk's [sic] call him, is assigned a case for an
opinion he dives i n to reading the record and a l l briefs. He absolutely masters
t h e fa c t s a n d the argu m ents . T h e n h e moves into the rel evant l i tera
ture-cases, statutes, treatises, and law reviews. The clerks often read along
with him or dig out additional material and feed it to him. The issues will be
discussed i n termittently. After a while Black will feel that he is ready to do a
first draft of the opinion , assuming he has not changed his m i nd and decided
to vote the other way, and this occasionally happens. The draft is then turned
over to the c lerks, and, with a l l the confidence of youth, they work it over . . . .
Often revisions resu l t ; sometimes a clerk can get a word or comma accepted,
but the substance and a decision are never anything but Black's alone. " '

Finally, Norman Dorsen, who clerked for Justice Harlan, com
pletes our depiction of the duties generally performed by clerks at
the S uprem e Court:
Some law clerks also prepare mem oranda summarising [sic] the contend
ing arguments in cases about to be heard by the court; these are known infor
mally as " be n c h m emos" because the justices use them in preparation for oral
argument. Such m emoranda outline the precedents and possible lines of ap
proach to the case and often suggest questions for counsel. The clerks may a lso
provide help on written opinions, such as research on legal points not covered
or covered inadequately in the briefs of counse l . "
90.
!J I .
H:!.

FRANK, supra note :lO, at 1 1 6- 1 8 .
•. ,
,
. , c - ci ,
,
" ' · .d.f>O I I .lb_� ·
Jus tice H!ack and His [,all' ( /erhs, l !i AI.A. L . Rn .
( a l \'l•rl
dg<•
.Ju
Dorsen also d!'rkPd f or
Dorsen, supra note !i6, a t 268. Professor
Meador ,
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A look at the federal courts of a p peals discloses no great dispar
i ty in the principal work of the clerk- "reading, research, first
drafts, revisions, footnote supple mentation, proofreading, and the
c hecking of galley proof incident to any pub lishing operation . "!J:i In
his survey Dorsen reports that a frequent practice in the federal
c ircuits is for each j udge, after oral argument but before a formal
vote is taken, to circulate a memorandum among his brothers ex
pressing h is views, and that law clerks may assist in preparation of
these me moranda .94
Passing to state appellate courts , the literature of recollect ion
i s rather threadbare. There is one good piece, however, written by
two former clerks of the Wisconsin S upreme Court. From their de
scription I would guess the duties of Wisconsin's "law examiners"
are typical of those performed by clerks in other j urisdictions :
[T]he primary duty of each clerk is to prepare a legal memorandum on
each of the cases assigned to his justice. The cases are assigned by the chief
justice from the monthly docket, which consists of a maximum of 28 cases.
These assignments usually are made in the last week of the preceding m o n t h ,
when t h e briefs have been filed.
The memos consist of a summary of the facts, an enumeration of the
issues, and a discussion analyzing the facts and law on each issue. They m ay
be relatively short or quite lengthy, depending upon the complexity of the case,
and are concluded by the clerk's recom mendation . During the course of memo
preparation the clerk may discuss the cases with his justice, but his concl u
sions and recommendation are usually independent. His justice, of course,
may not agree with the conclusions reached.
·

During the preparation of his memos each clerk must carefully check the
validity of the authorities cited by each side, and then Shepardize the relevant
cases. Too often incorrect authorities are cited in briefs . . . .
The clerks are usually expected to read through parts of the record and
check it against the statement of facts and appendices in the briefs . . . .
In analyzing the legal arguments i n the pre paration of a memo, some
independent research is usually required, even when the briefs are well pre
pared. In some cases the parties do not discuss, or adequately discuss' a crucial
issue or issue s . Then, under the Court's supervision, the clerk must d i g out the
law and attempt to consider the possible contentions on each side as to its
application."''
Ma �ru<ler of the First Circuit before serving Justice Harlan. It has become somewhat preva·
lf:'n t toda y t ha t Supreme Court clerks work a year at the intermediate appellate lev e l before
serving t heir .Justices.

9:1.
94.

.Johns<m, 8Upra note 22, at 26 1 .

!l:i .

Ragat z & Shea. Supn•me Court Law Clerk s , 35 Wis . B.
BULL. 33, 33-34 (Aug. 1962 ) .

Dorsen , ·'upra note 56, at 268; see Lumbard, Current Problems of
the Federal Courts
"f App1•als. !i4 CoRNF.LL L. REv. 29, 39-40 ( 1 968) . Justice John Francis
of the New Jersey
S u pn•mc Court has also described his use of clerks incident to post-argu ment
procedure s. See
Fra n r is. P"st-1\ rt;w1u•11/ l'rocedur rs, Panel Discussion, in Am. Bar Ass'n
Annual Meeting '
A11g 8. 1 910. !i:Z F . R. D . 70, 7 1 .
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Certainly it a ppears from these recollections that any consensus
of the duties of the l aw c l erk would include the task of preparing
m e moranda on c ases about to be heard, or on those that have been
heard, in t h e appel late foru m . These reports serve to apprise the
.
judges of the nature of the appeal and the issues presented, and in
those jurisdictions where the reports are prepared prior to oral argu
ment, they contri bute to a more effective discussion between the
court and counsel at the hearing in the case .96
B.

The Baggage Tasks

It is also clear that any profile of the law clerk's duties would
include those tasks that, although clearly a part of the job, somehow
are not fe lt befitting the young law graduate, who arrives at the
court with J . D . in hand only to find some menial task waiting in the
wings . Take barbering for instance-an example drawn from the
historical accounts. Our predecessor in title was the messenger, the
fellow hired by the judge because literally there were messages to
deliver and bags t o carry . Professor Newland m entions the messen
ger as historical antecedent of today's clerk and notes the typical
serv i c e s requ ired . In one particular he refers to a messenger de
scribed in a letter to Justice Gray as "the best servant I ever saw
and withal a good barber . "97
Today the law clerk's job has been formally bifurcated from
that of messenger and even from the position of stenographic clerk.
But the "baggage tasks" rem ain. In Michigan they were called "Sil
ver Mercuries" after the judges' cars. There was even a trophy pre
sented each week by the Chief Judge to the clerk who had gone out
of his way to serve his judge . My best effort was to drive about 400
mi les to bring emergency motions to my judge . It was not good
enough to take the trophy, however Some clerks really put out-it's
.
all part of the job. I remember washing my judge's car-I used his
credit card-and, more curiously, the afternoon when in the middle
of some research I was called to the bench during orals and handed
a note by my judge that read : "We've been on the bench for almost
five hours . I'm hungry. Get me a corned beef on rye . " I did, and on
my return the court took a short recess. ux Perhaps there is more to
York Su prt'llll' Court
The d u ties of the " law assistants" of the Appella te Division of the New
KARLEN, supra note 84, at 1 8 - 1 9 .
i11fra.
96. See note 1 2 4 and text accom panyin g notes 126 & 1 :27
! . q1111t1•d i11 :\l•wla nd. suwa
RR
I
:20,
Dec.
Gray.
orace
to
H
Let ter from David Davis
97.

a re described in D.

note 1:!, at 300-0 1 .
98 .

H a d ,Judge Gillis also instru cted me t o find

some

preced ent for t ht>

rt>n•ss. t rn l' t 1 1
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the notion of gastronomical j urispru dence than most p undits of the
judicial process are willing to admit .
From the history i t appears the law clerk always has been asso 
c iated with the secretarial side of the dichotomy-in the literal
sense of the word. Again, the first official reference to the institu 
tion, Garla n d ' s re port, suggested to Congress that this new em
ployee was "to be a stenographer . . . whose duties shall be to assist
in such clerical work as might be assigned to him . "99 This sounds
almost exclusively like the secretarial side of the job . The Attorney
General continued however:
The labor of the judges of the court in investigating questions and preparing
their opinions is immense, and while the heads of Departments and Senators
have this assistance,

I

do not think there is any good reason that the ju dges of

this court should not also have it, and
sions be made. 11•1

I

therefore recom mend that such provi 

This, by contrast, is the work more closely aligned with the law
clerkship in the finest tradition of the institutio n . Here Garland's
words suggest parti cipation by the clerk beyond the m enial
tasks-the barbering of the job . He anticip ates the clerk serving his
judge as an aid in research and in opinion writing . It is to these
latter aspects of the job that any sketch of the law clerk's duties
eventually turns, for here the clerk makes his most substantial con
tribution to the adm inistration of appellate justice.
C.

Research

You should find the ensuing year full of legal research. What
ever effort you put into the course at law school, or into the R eview
if you were a member, you will probably find mirrored in your work
for the court, and this time on each appeal. The research required
is monumenta l. To see where your case fits in, you often will find
yourself tracing far back into the reports, sniffing out the birth,
growth, and perhaps the demise of legal doctrin e . I m a de it as far
back as 1 M ichigan in the official reports-even further unofficia lly .
All of this you must accompl ish for yourself this time, without the
aid of a caseboo k editor. But generall y yours is the best library the
I �£' p os i l ion of clerk. I could have. It seems that
even at the Suprem e Court of the United
S1 a l l's the re are 1.• m.es when hunger gets the best
of the Justices . Attorne y General Garland
dPscnhe s I hr confusio n that resulted i n the late
n ineteen th century when some of the Justice s
ll' f l t h c h(•11rh to t a k e t heir lunch behind the
velvet curtain immed iately to the rear of
the
l :ench. D1!nng l he hungry hours, argume
nt had to proceed against the clatter of
china. " A .
( ,AIU.AN[ ), r.XPElm :Nn: I N THF. lJN ITF:ll STATES SUPREM
E COURT 63 ( 1898 ) .
!l!l.
I HHf> An'v CEN. ANN. RF.P. 4 ::! , quoted i n Newla
nd ' supra note 13 a t 301
J OO. Id.
..

'

.
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fresh gra d u ate ever encountered . Barring som e baggage task, I rec
o m m e n d t h a t y o u spend y o u r fi rst hours at the court browsing
through the lib rary's titles . I had never heard of App leman on Insur
ance as a student, yet if you look you will discover it has 26 volumes.
And i t is best to browse at the start of the job-it saves time and
effort. I recall l earning of Appleman' s treatise halfway through my
first insurance appeal . And what about Cooley o n Constitutional
Lim ita tions ? I never had heard of Michigan's pre-eminent Chief
Justice either, until working as a clerk. All students have heard of
Casner's A m erican Law of Prop erty. Even I had, although I had
never leafed through it for fear of its size. But can you imagine,
there is even a treatise on the Fundam entals of Hotel Law? Or on
the Law of Sheriffs, Coroners, and Consta b les? A l l of these will
beco me fam ous to you as clerk . Or infamous . 101
In the grand tradition of the institution you should also find
yourself writing the footnotes-like Dean Acheson, who served Jus
tice Brandei s :
He wrote the opinion; I wrote the footnotes .
My footnotes up to that time were the Mount Everest of footnotes. Today,
Justices of the Supreme Court write textbooks as marginal annotations of their
opinion, but up to that time I had written the greatest footnotes, fifteen pages
of footnotes.
And what were we trying to do? We were collecting all the legislation and
all the decisions of the forty-eight states and the Territories of the United
States as to what was an intoxicating beverage. The purpose of this, of course,
was to show that when Congress said "one half of one per cent of alcohol by
volume is intoxicating," that that was reasonable, because all the states had
said everything in the world beside that. And compared to the confusion of the
states, this was Reason Incarnate. So I went to work on the opinion. 1112
Wl . It was suggested to the new clerks that they obtain a copy of TATE & HEBERT'S,
TREATISES FOR JuoGES ( 197 1 ) , an accumulation of even the most esoteric titles. Reading i t
tends to frighten the ordinary, unbibliographic mind. However, those who heard ,Justice
Tate's presentation at the Institute would realize his is hardly the bibliographic mind. Per
haps something of the "New Hampshire M ethod, " see note 42 supra, is alive in Louisiana as
well. No doubt had Justice Tate touted his own book he would have added that good bibliog
raphy is essential but not sufficient. See genera lly Tate, The Law-Makin!! Function of the
Jud!(e, 28 LA . L. REV. 211 ( 1968) .
1 02. Acheson, Recollections
:3 5.� . 364-65 ( 1957 ) .

of Service

with the Federal Suprem e Court, 1 8 ALA. LAW.

Sometimes w h a t i s s a i d i n the footnotes proves more important th an the t ex t o f t he

opinion itself. The best example is Justice Stone's famous Carolenf' Products foot not('. s,.,.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U . S . 1 44, lll2 n.4 ( 1 9:18). H u t i t was probahl.v
Stone hi mself who wrote the note. Nonetheless, it is i m portant to realize t hnt some t i m e s t h(•

notes are just as potent as the body of the opinion . To the extent t hat t h e clerks hnn• n hand
i n fashioning the footnotes. there remains a serious problem of delega t ion . See t ext ac rn m p a 
n y i n g notes J ll8 & lll9 infra. ,Justice Frankfurter, however. has rrit icized t h(' Court 's feint note

[Vol.
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c h the
No doubt some of you will be sent by your judge to resear
tion
, for
s
instruc
curiou
the
with
entire N ational Reporter System
g
i nsta nce, to am ass all the author i t i es demon stratin that w h en
parties stipulat e in their contracts that "time is of the essence , "
they do not mean it, and even if they do, courts need not enforce
the clause . '03 At least such were the j udicial ways of Judge Charles
Levin of the Michigan Court of Appeals , that court's prem ier fo ot
notist. He even has his own trophy for it, given him by his colleagues

104
on the bench.
At first you may find these research demands strange . This is
research like no other you have experienced . It follows the decision,
not the other way round-you seek out precedent sustaining the
judgment, not determining it. It is probably here, in the disquiet of

initial research , that the clerk first tastes the

judicial process for

himself.
Finally, all this research inevitably nudges the clerk to side
deliberations about the nature of the adversary system and about
the functions of courts as well as his own. You will wonder whether,
because of the weakness of the briefs, it is the judge's job to protect
the litigants. Is a State 's confession of error on a criminal appeal
jurisdictional? Or is the court obliged on its own to scrutinize the
record in the case and the applicable law in order to assure the
validity of the concession? When the advocacy is all one -sided, is it
the judge 's job to fill in the balance? 100 In this regard, a former
Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin Griswol d, questions
"whether the law clerks are in fact performing some of the aspects
practice: "A footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new cons t i t u 
t i onal doctrine . . . . " Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U . S . 7 7 , 90-91 (1949) (concurring opinion ) .

103.
1 04.

See, e.ff . Rothenberg v . Follman, 1 9 Mich. App. 383, 172 N .W.2d 845 ( 1969 ) .

The idea was Judge Gillis's. The trophy is a framed piece o f parchment covered
with columns of asterisks, or "Ampernils" as they are designated on the award. An ampernil,
accordin g to Judge Gillis, is a nonsense word for footnote, signifying to the reader that he
need not bother with the extensive marginal annotations so often appearing at the bottom of
judicial opinions. especially those of Judge Levin. All of this naturally was meant in good fun .
. J udge Levin, now a .Ju st i c e of the Michigan Supreme Court, is highly regarded for his scholar

s h i p on the court-sometimes footnotes notwithstanding. Telephone conversation with Judge
.John H. Cillis. Sep t 26. 1972.
I O:i . ( '{. R. PotJNll, APPELLATF. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 381-82 ( 1941 ) :
I know of one l'<>urt where it frequently happened that records were so confused a n d
hrids s o inadequate t h a t the court would depute one commissioner t o make a statement
·

.

and argument for a ppt> ll a n t and another to do the like for appellee. It is not often that
('ourts art• so anxious to do exact justice to parties who do not present their
cases as the)
shou l d . But PVl'n if a busy co urt cannot go so far, the waste
of time in trying to disposi
adPq ua t l'ly o! a t·ast• inadequnt l'ly presented is no small item in apportion ing
the energie
of a l most a n�· rl'\' l!'Wlll g court .
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of t he work t ha t has tradit ion a l ly been done by counsel . " '°6 Simi
larly , how free is t he clerk to suggest to his judge- and how free is
the court-to rest the decision on a rationale unmenti oned by the
parti es ? ""
D.

Writing

From t h e very first reference to the office , 108 the literature al
ways has focused o n the draftsmanship of the clerk . How much
writing is accom plished by the clerk? And how m uch is appropriate?
At one extre m e , some judges permit nothing written by the clerk to
appear in the opinion of the court . In some courts, the clerk is
relegated to the job of snipping, rearranging, and pasting his judge's
draft to provide m ore logic and flow. O ne of Stone's c lerks recalls
the cutting task this way:
Accordingly, he directed his clerk to go through the opinion and outline the
points, arranging t h e m in a logical order. That done, and Stone having revised
the outline, t h e next j ob was to take the printed proof and a pair of scissors
and arrange t h e material according to the outline, deleting and where neces
sary combining and rewriting, to remove duplications, and introducing each

point by a topic or transitional sentence. 109

In my case th ere was much writing. Happily for me, Judge
Gillis was not a judge determ ined to place every comma or complete
every sentence for h imself, although his was always the final draft.
The experience is far more rewarding for the clerk this way, even if
it mean s enduring the pangs of his judge's criticism. Arguably it is
a l so the more l i berating for the judge, for he is then free for the
harder task of judging. And that task of judging, as opposed to
verbalizing the opinion, was never mine-either by statement or
even by suggestion . Let me say categorically, as have other clerks
unanimou s ly before me, that the judgments were always Judge Gil
l i s ' s . 1 rn And t his sometimes required him to reject whole sent106. Griswold, Appellate Advocacy, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 342. 353-54 ( 197 1 ) .
107. Cf. United States v . Falstaff Brewing Corp. , 410 U.S. 526, 574-7f'i ( 1 97:1) ( Rehn 
q u i s t.. J ., dissenting ) ("For this Court to reverse a n d to remand for considerati on of a possihlt•

factual basis for a t h eory never advanced by the plaintiff is a drastic and unwarrn n t Pd
depart ure from the most basic principles of civil litigation and appellate review. " ) .
108 . See text accompanyin g note 100 supra .
, ·. . l .
1 09. McCorm a ck, A Law Clerk 's Recollections, 46 CoLVM. L. R.F.v. 7 10 . 71 l ( l .l l h
w
ns
lw n t lw
occasio
rare
hose
t
on
"Even
v..
l 1 0 . See, e.g. , rttANK
, supra note '30, at l 18·
.
·
· ·
te m a t t ers of ves or no. 111f1rm
c1 erk d oes t. h e wntmg. th e J Ud ge d oes the decidin g · The ultima.
. their
.
.
. own hands · · · In my own ·vl'!;r " ' . 11 lnw l'i<•rk,
or reverse, the Judges mvartably
keep m
.
· ·
I had 11re!'lselv 1111 111flt1('l1<'(' "11
mv .Just ice made approxim ately one thousan d dec1s10ns. and
.
text accom pnn�·in g- 11"1''' �111 &
ar;y of them . " But see Rehnq uist, notes 2 & 5 supra . SeP a lso
·

.

·

DJ s11pra .

·

.
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ences-even words-from his clerks ' tentative drafts.
It was my task nonetheless to prepare first drafts. At the b egin
ning of each monthly term of court, Judge Gillis would receive the
call of next m ont h ' s co mplement of c ases, usually 2 1 , fro m the
clerk's office, including the briefs in each case and the complete
transcripts i n the seven to ten cases he was assigned to write . The
assignments were made pro rata by the Chief Judge among the
panel's three judges. The next few days were ones of little communi
cation between the j udge and m e . He would spend quiet, undis
turbed hours either at home in his study or in the office, with the
briefs of counsel and his case call. I was right in guessing that these
were the hard hours of judgment . F inally , he would emerge from his
s i lence and return with all the p apers, which then fell into my
hands, save one-the case-call list . At this point it was my function
to prepare seven draft opinions and to have them ready b y the end
of the month if at all possible . The task, at least at the outset, was
the hardest I have ever faced. Judge Gillis had little time to instruct
me ; he delegated the instruction to my predecessor in offi ce, who
unfortunately was too busy himself to temper the uncertainty that
literally frightens one in the beginning. It is no light task to reach
an informed conclusion of law on the facts and then to verbalize it
as would Cardozo or Hand. I soon discovered there was hardly room
for law as literature in Judge Gillis's office ; 1 t 1 there simply was too
little time, although the office continued to make the atte m p t .
This brings m e t o a n important point. It is the only advice I
insist you underscore with the student's nota bene. There i s a tend
ency at the start of the job-call it "Treatise-itis" -for the clerk to
incorporate all the law of search and seizure for instance in his first
suppre ssion draft. Perhaps this is inevita le . Neverth less resist
the temptat ion. The reports are full enough of reiterate d law. 1 12 My
own experien ce was to trace the law of search and s eizure from

b

�

Harris to Rabino witz to Chimel . 1 1 3 This was the fruit of my
researc h.

It toc�k almost a eek of reading the cases. Natura lly I though
�
t all
of. t�1s belon ed m the opinio n to reflect my efforts .
?
Not Judge
.
G illis. And his, I am convinced, was the greater wisdo
m . Treat ises
1 1 1.

Ser• /,nil' and Lit rrature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN
CARDOZO 33 9

( 1\1 . H a l l l'd . 194 7 ) .

1 1 :! . Cf. Lu mb ar d . Current Problem" of the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 5 4 CORNELL L.
lh:v . :!!l . ·IO 11 . 1 :, ( H J(i8) (judge usually expands the clerk's
facts by about 100% and reduces
l1 1s law h:-· ahout :,() " ; ) .
1 1 :1 . C ' hi mt•I v . C a l ifor n ia , :191; U . S . 752 ( 1969) ; United States v
. Habinow itz ' 33 9 U . S .
,-,1; ( l !t:,o i : H a rris \'. U n i t ed St ates, il:1 1 U . S . 145 ( 1947 ) .
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have no place in appellate opinions, albeit too many are written that
way . 1 1 1 Moreover, it was not Judge Gillis's institutional function to
write treatises . H is was an intermediate appellate court where all
app eal s , civil and criminal, are taken as of right. In such a forum,
the cases do n ot w a rrant, nor does the case load perm it, seven trea
ti ses a month . 1 1"
I have m entioned the one paper I would never see, the monthly
call list. I learned that on it Judge Gillis recorded his initial decision
in each case, after reading the briefs of the parties and working alone
on the matter. His annotations were quite simple : A for affirmance,
R for revers a l , or dub itante when undecided. Sometimes he would
ask me to read the transcripts in certain cases in the month ahead
with an eye toward particular issues and to report my findings. But
I never knew while working on the drafts whether my conclusions
matched the A's or R's on the call list. Finally at the end of the
month, J udge Gillis would leave his office for the hearing, often in
another city, with h i s work product and mine in hand. Sometimes I
1 1 4.

B . E . Witkin notes that the most consistent and sustained of all the com p l a ints of

critics, lay and legal, is that opinions are much too long. APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS, SYLLABUS

53 ( 1 966 ) . See Gregory, Shorter Judicial O pin io

ns ,

34 VA. L. REV. 362, 364 ( 1 948) ("The

primary purpose of a n o p i nion is to decide a case. It is not to expound legal p hilosophy or to
be an ideal piece o f legal l iterature. Nor is it necessary to exhaust all the law and cite all t h e
cases . " ' ) ; McComb, A

M andate from the Bar: Shorter and More Lucid

Opinions, 35 A.B.A.J.

382 ( 1 949) .
1 1 5.

If the court is an intermediate appellate court, its institutional function may

preclude preparation of extensive opinions in a l l cases. In such a forum, the immediate task
at hand is the corrective one, that is, assuring that justice is done in each particular case.
Broad declarations of policy are more appropriately left to the elaborate precedential function

s ra

o f the high court. See R. PouND , supra note 105, at 3 - 4 ; 8. WITKIN, up
note 1 1 4, at 17-19.
Function of the Appellate System, in JUSTICE IN THE STATE S :

See generally Joiner, The

ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON T H E JUDICIARY 97 ( 1 97 1 ).

The case of People v. Ramsey, 385 Mich. 221, 187 N . W . 2d 887 ( 197 1 ), rev '{! 25 Mich. App.
fi76, 1 8 1 N . W.2d 553 ( 1970), is illustrative. Ramsey's conviction for armed robbery was re
versed hy t h e M i c higan Supreme Court because the trial judge had looked at the pre l i m inary

examination in the case, which had not been introduced as evidence. thus violating t h e

accused's right t o confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him . The Court of Ap
peals had affirmed the conviction on the ground that, even assuming error, thi., defendant
had not been prejudiced because a review of both the prelim inary examination t ranscript an d
he t rial t ranscript. revealed no testimony given at the former hearing t hat was no! re pea l e d

I

at trial subject to confrontation and full cross-examination. This may very well have bri•n

j u s t i ce in Ra ms ey's p a r t icular case, but what about good t rial practice in ! he criminal court s
of t he St at e? Arguably, t h i s was for t h e Michigan Supreme Court alone, i n l i ght o f i t s <list i n cl

i n s t ii ut i o na l r o l e a s fra mer of system-wide principles of general applicat ion. ,.;,. , . H u ls l !'cill'r.
N,.,,. litrJcks for Old Pvramids: Rrshapinp th1• Judicial Systrm . 44 S . CAJ.. L. REV. !JO I . 9 1 1 1
t l !l7 1 J . And. indeed. t h e Supreme Cour t 's opinion i n the case suggest s a n a pp roach l rn nsc!'11 1 i 
i n g an.v l i m i ted concern f o r t h e correct ness o f t he juclgmcnl below. Hnthc·r. t h!' courl 1 1 n 
n o u 1wNI a n absol u t e rule of goocl criminal procedure. reg1udless of prej u d i n• 1·1·1 111111. nnd
adopt(•d t lw prophyla c t ic of reversal t o enforce it. S1·1· :It!!'> M ich . nl :?:!!'>. J H7 !\' . \\" . :!d n t �H!I_
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went along to tote the bags or was invited to hear the orals. The
anxious moment was the Judge 's return home after the argument.
It was then I first learned Judge Gillis' s view. If the judges were
agreed on the judgment after their post-argument conference and if
my draft was acceptable with some collegial retou ching, then the
case went down straight away. Those were proud moments for m e .
They were few, b u t they made the work, especially the evening
work, all the more rewarding. Usually cases were held up, however,
for further reflection among the panel and redrafting by the clerks.
There were other occasions when I was not so fortunate, when the
draft R simply didn't jibe with Judge Gillis's and the panel's A. On
the Judge's return I was invited into chambers to argue the point,
and argue I did, sometimes quite loudly . I only succeeded once, and
that occasion was unusual because I received help from Judge
Quinn, another Judge of the Court of Appeals. The panel was about
to hear the case in Detroit. The question was the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove an intent to steal; the breaking and entering were
conceded. In my view there was not enough, and I was called in on
the matter by Judge Gillis, who had read my recommendation to
reverse . On arrival I received one of those substantive exposures
that makes up the clerk's post-graduate legal education-on this
occas ion a fatherly discourse on circumstantial evi dence. Judge
Quinn dropped by and was asked his opinion; he was also on the
panel . Judge Quinn's view matched mine for reasons he explained
to Judge Gillis. I must say I was rather piqued at how attentively
my j udge listened to Judge Quinn's view when he had r ej ected mine
out of hand. But such was the nature of Judge Gillis's A ' s when
pitched against his clerks R's. And, reflecting on the point, the
question of circumstantial evidence is one best remitted to the judg
ment of experience, rather than to the theorizing of a fledgling law
graduate . Judge Quinn had had quite a few years on the trial bench .
On questions of theory, however, on those rare appeals raising
matters res integra as he called them, Judge Gillis would always
consult his clerks even if his views were somewhat fixed. Here theo
ri zing is useful, m and there is one concurring opinion in the Michi1 I G._ Earli er in t he text it was suggested that a clerk's duties
are often influence d by
.
t ht> part intlar forum
he serves . Perhaps it should be added that
the clerk who works for an
111t n111 ed 1 a t e court of appeals makes a more substant ial contri
' but1·0n toward improving
.
.
.
.
,
th e
·
·
q u a l i t v of app e ll a t e Judgmen ts than his counterpart on a court
of last resort. In cases reviewed
cour t . t he quest ions are often policy oriente
h\' a su pn•rne
d, wi' th ph'l
.
.
.
.
,
1 osop h.ica I an d normative
ovnton Ps; since t he JUs t 1 ees de term in e these questions
for themselves, the utility of the law
_
cl<>rk 1s less subst ant ial. In rntermed1ate courts of appeals
, h owever, th e quest 10ns
'
are o 1·ten
·

I
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gan Reports that represents the reciprocal work of judge and clerk
in the grand tradit ion of the clerkship institution . 1 1 ;
F i n a l ly on this writing point, what agony to redraft an opinion
wholly the other way . Yet I assure you , you will discover that it can
be done a n d a l m ost always without sacrificing either the precedent
or, indeed , even one's sense of what is right in the case . It was my
function to verbalize my j udge's judgment. With his redrafting the
task was complete . I thought it curious at first that each time I was
assigned the task of writing full circle the other way I found it could
be done, and done q uite legitimately on the precedent and values
involve d . After enough of this I discovered first hand the teaching
of the Bram b le Bush :
[ It I is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it-to wit, the
idea t h a t the cases t hemselves and in themselves, plus the correct rules on how
to handle cases, provide one single correct answer to a disputed issue of law.
In fact t h e available correct answers are two, three, or ten. The question is:
Wh ich of t he available correct answers will the court select-and why? For
since there is al ways more than one available correct answer, the court always
has to se lect . 1 "

And a lmost a lways there inheres i n the eventual adjudication a
delicate balance:
There i s in nearly every case a n area o f choice. How a judge marks out
and determines that area largely determines the type of judge he is. In this
area, most matters are ones of degree, ones of more or less. They are not black
and white .
. . . That is what judges are for. Within this area, it may not be possible
to give a purely logical demonstration that one result is better than another.
A judge has to call on all the resources of his experience and wisdom in coming
to a conclusion. Some judges hew rather closely to the line; some are more free
wheeling. 1 1 »
t echnical in nature, requiring just the kind of ski l l the law clerk brings to the office. The range

of t h e clerk's influence is thus expanded. Moreover, at the intermedi ate appellat.e level there
is much more use for the creative suggestions of the law clerk about the u l t i mate disposition
of the case. including modification of the judgment below, than at the supreme court . See
M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 107-08 ( 1 970).
1 1 7.

H a rrison v . Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 616, 1 74 N . W.2d 875.

888 ( 1 969 ) ( Gi l lis, J . , concurring ) . Recently the posit i on taken by .Judge Gillis i n Harri8rm
was finally adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lowe v. Local 705. Hotel & Restaur
ant Employees, 389 Mich. 123, 205 N.W.2d 167 ( 1 973 ) . It is probably typical for a clerk to
Irave his judge and court with an especial fon dness for one or 2 cases of si gniticanre that arose

rluring his tenure. See WILLISTON, supra note 17. at 256-58.

I 1 8 . Llewellyn. Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the R11/ps or Canons
A huu t How Statu tes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 ( 1 950) . See f.!1•m·rally K.
L 1 r.w ELLYN THE BRAMBLE BusH 62-63 ( 1 960) .
.

1 1 9.

Griswold,

Earl Warren a n d

the Supreme Court, Christian Science Monitor. De('.
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case to case and are
Finally , I learne d that "the rules chang e from
i s the indisp e nsrules
the
in
change
this
remade with each case . Yet
.
0
1
1
"
2
i y of aw.
able dyna mic qua l't
l process for myself I would only
judicia
the
tasted
Had I not
the important though ts they
for
read these words as words, not
surely are . Perhaps you have only heard them as words too . Read
them anew at the end of your clerkship . You will have m ade a
discovery of inestimab le value to you later, as practitio ner, profes
sor, or whatever. It is a disclosure that the institution allows its
clerks to retain as individuals , and you are privileged to m ake that
discovery for yourselves .
E.

In ternal Opera ting Proc edure

This brings us back to the impact of a court's o perating proce
dure on the shape of its clerks' duties . To reiterate : the tasks per
formed by a law clerk often depend on the particular forum h e serves
and on its internal operating methods. Those who have surveyed the
clerkship always make the point that the duties of a clerk depend
primarily on the personal wishes of his judge . 121 Leac h , who served
Justice Holmes, tells us for example that early in Holmes's judicial
career the petitions for certiorari, or "Petes for Cert " a s Holmes
called them, were always handled by the Justice h i mself, although
he later adopted the practice prevalent among the other Justices of
having his clerk prepare memoranda on such petitions. 1 22 If no cer
tiorari petitions were ever filed in our prospective clerk's court, the
question of an appropriate allocation of this task between j u dge and
clerk would never arise. Thus there are institutional constraints at
work here that must also be considered. The personal whims of
judge alone are not entirely controlling.
Some of the specifics should be obvious. Unless a clerk is work
ing for a court whose jurisdiction is discretionary, he can never be
asked to report on whether the court should take the case . If the
court is an intermediate appellate court, the clerk' s work will not
include preparation of " cert memos. " Rather, in such a forum all
ap peals are generally brought to the court as of right; there is no
:!:\. l !lfi8. a t 7 . col. fi,
:i!li , () 1 8 - l !l ( l !lfi9 ) .

quoted

in Stone,

The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi

I �(), :.� · LEVI, A N INTHO�>llCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949) .

'

22 MODERN L . REV.

. Ll . .
Onl' charac teristic commo n to the work
of the clerks has appare ntly been t h a t
t lwir d u t H ' s haw been determ ined entirel y b y
their individua JUSt'tees. " N ewIand , s pra note
u
.
.
,
! . \, at . \ 1 1 'i1•1· also l l'Xl accom panyin g note 90
.

l :!�-

.

L<•a c h . s11pra note .S9, at 1 2- 1 3 .

supra.

I·
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dis cretion to exerc i s e . The judge and his clerk must somehow face
all cases a l i ke .
In addition to these j urisdictional considerations there are less
visi b l e fac to r s , i nternal to the court's operation, that affect the
shape of the c lerk ' s fu nction . To continue for the moment with the
certiorari e x a m p l e , even when the cou rt's jurisdiction includes the
discretionary grant, the law clerk may not find himself working on
such petiti o n s , not because of the personal preferences of his judge,
but on account of the operating m ethods of his court. To i l lustrate:
several state courts of last resort whose j urisdiction is discretionary
employ a staff wholly separate from the law clerks, usually commis
sioners, to p e rform the certiorari or screening fun ction . m Again, in
such courts the c lerk's duties would n e ver include preparation of
certiorari m e m oran da .
The internal d e cision-making process o f the appeals court also
will affect its clerks' dutie s . It used to be the general practice in
appellate courts that the judges obtained their first knowledge of a
case at oral argu m e n t . The idea was for the judges to approach each
case with an open mind and without any view of the merits . Today,
a lthough there may be exceptions, the standard practice is for the
judges to apprise t hemselves before oral argument of the nature of
the appeal a n d of t h e issues presented. m Immediately after the orals
123.

For e x a m ple, the Michigan Supreme Court uses commissioners to review all appli·

cat ions for leave to appeal, to prepare a digest o f the facts, and to make recommend ations
on disposition of t h e applications. COUNCIL, supra note 38, Table XIII, at 76; see
of Commissioner of the Michigan Court of Appeals and Its Role in the Appellate

The Office
Process, 48

F'.R.D. 355 ( 1970 ) . See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SOLUTIONS FOR APPELLATE
CouRT CONGESTION AND DELAY, Infor. Sheet No. 24, at 8-9 ( 1963); Lilly & Scalia, Appellate
Justice: A Crisis in Virginia ? , 57 VA. L
.REv. 3 , 3 1 -34 ( 1 971).
1 24.

The judges generally learn o f the case by reading the briefs and sometimes the

record on appeal. M. SCHICK, supra note 1 16, at 90-91; see Hopkins, Small Sparks from

a

Lou· Fire: Some Refiections on the Appellate Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551, 567 ( 1972)
("A 'hot' court-that i s one that is fa miliar with the facts and questions in the appeal before

argume n t - is notably

better equipped

to stimulate a more effective discussion between t he

court and counsel a n d to narrow the i ssues . " ) . .Justice Tate informed me t h a t at t he first
In t e rmed i ate Appellate Judges Seminar in 1959 only 2 out of 20 judges made it a sta ndard
pract ice to study the b riefs and record in advance of the orals in th e case. Today, a ppl' l l a t e
j u d ges almost unan i m ously read the briefs o f t h e parties before oral argu m e n t . lnt ervi�w wit h
.Justice Albert Tate, Jr., in Baton Rouge, Sept. l, 1972.

Sometimes allegiance to the older practice of approaching each appeal "col d . "

t hnr is.

w it hou t. any prior knowledge of the case, moves a senior judge to chast ise nn ups t a r1 juni"r

who

comes

prepared for the orals. Judge Medina descri bes his fi rs t day on t hl' Sl•cond C i rc u i t

a s follow s :

I

co uld

hardly wait to be up there on t h e bench list e n i ng to t he ari.:unH•nls. S" I mul

a l l t h e b ri efs and what we call appendices in t h

I

e cases co m i ng up

he bif.( day I marched up to the bench from t h e robing room at

I ht•

for ar).(unw n t . nncl "n
l'IHI 111" t lw prllct·ssinn.
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or in some j urisdictions before the argument, a conference of the
judges is held at which a tentative decision is reached in the case .
Typical of these conference systems is that described by .J udge Mol
inari in his article

Court of Appeal.

The Decisionmak ing Conferen c e of the Ca lifo rn ia
Judge Molinari notes that the success of the

12"

system depends on the strength of t he calendar m e m oranda 1 2i; pre 
pared in the cases and written, where the conference system is em
ployed, by the law clerks. These are the bench m e mos, or pre hearing
memoranda. The important point here is that when a c ourt is com
mitted by its i nternal operation to preparation in advance of the
orals, its clerks' duties are shaped ac cordingly . S hould the prospec 
tive law clerk be destined to s erve such a foru m -known as a "hot
court" in the j argon of judicial adm inistration-he will probably
spend m any hours preparing these prehearing report s . 12i
An e merging ideal now exists in the forefron t of appellate court
administration, an ideal that eliminates standardized, undi fferen
tiated treatment of all appeals. 1 28 The principal rationale of this
development is that with differentiation , with a screening mech
anism "separating the wheat from the chaff and treating each ac
cordingly, " 12!1 there comes a liberation of the judges for the bett er
performance of their duties , together with an i m prove m ent in the
with a p i l e of briefs and appendices under my arm. T o make mat ters worse, I asked a
number of questions during the arguments . At the end of the session we returned to the
robing room and one of the older judges sai d : "Trying to impress the populace, I see . "

That was shock number one. Surely a judge h a s the right t o read the briefs and records
in advance of the arguments, if he chooses to do so, and he has the right to ask quest ions .
too1
Medina, supra note 82,
125.
1 26 .

1 48-49.

at.

57 CALIF. L. REV. 606 ( 1969 ) .

"This me morandum, which is prepared b y one of t h e judges in conjunct ion w i t h
h i. s law clerk, consists of_a detailed statement of t h e facts in t h e case ( w i t h transcript refer
ences), th e content10ns of the parties, an analysis of the cases and authorities relied upon by
.
t he parties,
and the results, if any, of independent research. When completed this memoran
dum 18 dtstnbuted to each of the judges, together with copies of the briefs Id. a t 608.
."

�

1 2 7 . The jarg n should be changed to read "boiling court" instead. Justice Tate cor
rected my usage, pomtmg out that in a " hot court" the judges prepare themselves
in advance
for t.h e argument, but only by reading the briefs and sometimes
the record on appeal The
.
addition
of a prehearing report and a propose d memorandum opinion in the
case if warrante d -t h e so-called " Michigan pla n " -serves to k"m e
di the degree of preparedness ; the
. .,
..
.
hen boils, so to speak. Interview with Justice Albert Tate,
Jr., in Baton Rouge, Sept .
.

·

�'.'��7�.

l 28. See 11enerallv Baier & Lesinsk i ' /11 A 1 0 t e
·d f h Judicial
· · Process: A Proposal for Law
Curricular and Stude n·1 I nvo
. /uemen t, 56 JUDICA
TURE 100 ' 104 ( 1972)
:
.
I :W . Letter from .Judge Carl M cGowen to p
ro fessor Paul Carrmgton, July 15, 1966, m
Shafro t h, Surl'ev of thl' Un ited States Court f
s o A ppeals,
·

·

·

42 F.R.D. 243, 3 1 3 ( 1968) .
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quantity a n d qual ity of appellate justice . This ideal is best illus
trated by t h e internal operations of C hief Judge Lesinski's court in
Michi gan , a court n ationally respected for its development of effec
tive screening techniques. 1:io
In the Mi chiga n Court of Appeals a staff of professional em
ploye es, the Pre-Hearing Division, exists entirely separate from the
law clerks. Its prin c i pal function i s threshold scrutiny of all appeals
in order to sift out those that can be disposed of by a short per
curiam opi n i o n . The Division utilizes a pool of specially trained
"Research Attorneys" to prepare prehearing reports on all appeals.
These reports are like those usually prepared in other j urisdi ctions
to apprise the court of the nature of the appeal, but unlike other
jurisdi ctions they are not the work of the law clerks.131 As a result
of this refine ment of internal operations, I never personally prepared
a preheari n g m e m o . Rather, a report from the Pre-Hearing Division
accompanied the briefs and record i n e ach case when Judge Gillis
turned it over to m e . It was then m y custom if time allowed to work
on each appeal without reference to this report . After forming my
own views of the case I would check them against the recommenda
tions of the report . Such a syste m , where it exists, offers the judge
a built-in m ethod of checking the recommendations of his clerk.

V.

VALUE

OF

THE CLERKSHIP

What a bout the value of the institution itself to the clerks?
What does t h e l a w clerk carry with h i m-this time in his own
bags-as he leave s the court? We have already brushed over some
of the more important points. To emphasize them again : During his
s tay, the research required for the job will expose the clerk to wide
areas of substantive law, and t here are occasions when the judge
h imself will likely take the time to fill in some of the gaps. This is a
fine post-graduate education; m u c h is learned about appellate pro
cedure. For instance, nothing is really extraordinary about

a

writ of

prohibition or superintending control until the clerk sees a trial cut
short for himself. Sometim es all this exposure prompts the clerk to
write his own treatise, or at least a practice manual, on the appellate
i :io.

See Christian,

supra note 47, at. 60: .Jun1c1AL COUNCii. OF CALIFORNIA ,

TO THF. GOVF.RNOR AN!l THE LF.GISLATIJRE 24-26, :14-:l!i.

i9i0 Rt:rot<T

1 : \ 1 . Se1• uenerallv Lesinski & St.ockm eyer. !'rl'hl'aring Resf'art'h and Scri·1 ·11ing in till'
i1·ity. �fi
!'vfiC'higun Court "! Ap eals: One Court 's Meth1Jd f1Jr /n,.rcasing J11dicial H'<1d11ct
v AN!l. L. REV. 1 2 1 1 ( 1 97:! ) ; Lesinski, Re."•arch Assistants : Thi' Michigan r:.1p1'rl l'/11"1', J I )

p

.J unr.r.s' .J . !i4 ( 1 97 1 ) .
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d to remini s ce abou t
process . m The more nostalg ic clerks are satisfie
the c l erkshi p as an
their work, purporting all the while to study
institution. After a year of reading briefs, the c lerk is probab ly a
better brief writer for it. He will have heard good orals a n d bad and
probably knows the differen ce for himself now. A n d fro m all the
transcri pts he may even have learned somethi ng o f good trial pra c tice.

But there is exposure of a different kind too. It has nothing t o
do with substantive law, o r even with the substance of appellate
procedu re . Rather, you come face to face with the sublime truths of
this law job. Dean Acheson did, working for Justice Brandeis : ' ' .Jus
tice is a method; justice is a m ethod by which results are reached.
And when that method is followed . . . then you have Justice as
"

i :i:i
Again, after your clerkship you will
perfect as man can ever give .
recognize these words for the m agnificent insight they are.

There is the important lesson of the Bra m b le Bush in the clerk
ship. We have already mentioned thi s Y14 I would sketch in a further
emphasis, however. To those of you who will serve an int ermedi ate
appellate court, yours is the better tier fro m which to learn t he
secrets of the judicial process. At the least you will be the better
opinion reader because of it. After you have sweated through the
briefs of counsel and the record in the case for yourself, after your
judge has weighed all the nuances in the balance and the opinion is
out, keep your eye on how the c ase is handled On High. The view is
irresistibl e . A proud moment comes if further review is denied, but
the apocalypse comes the other way round, a fter the grant of review
and reversal. Read the final opinion slowly, carefully . After your
work you are in a position like few others to test the legitimacy of
the final articulation. And it may come as a surprise at first to see
whole lines of argument passed over by the high court. All the good
intermediate handiwork, all the precedent culled from the reports,
may very well be ignored . It rests forgotten on the shelf. That, you
will learn, is the privilege of final judgment. And the discovery is
exhilarating. It makes teachers of us all.
Finally, the clerk leaves the court with an especial fondness for
his judge . He has come to know him as a man now and as a friend .

�

Recent y on Justice Harlan's death, one clerk expressed the feelings
.
that stick with you after you leave your judge :
I :i2. See. e.g R. ROBERTSON & F KIRKH
AM JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
llNITF.D STATF.S (2d e d . R. Wolfson &
P. Kurla nd 195 1 ) .
1 :1: 1 . Ache� on, .� upra note 1 0 2 , a
t 366.
I :14. Sr•1• note 1 18 supra and accom
pany ing text.
. .

·

,
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[ W l h en I saw t he .J ustice recently in his hospital room, and he spoke to me
even in his d iscomfort w i t h a warmth and lilt that showed he was ready once
again to give of h i mself, t he bonds of affection that have been building through
t he years of our acquaintance were brought suddenly to tension and pressed
to tears for this estimable man. m

me

Reading this, any clerk who has been through it for hi mself m ight
very well share those tears.
VI.

LAW CLERK AS JUDG E : THE DELEGATION QUESTION

In the end we return to the delegation question: Is it possible
that the institution has usurped its master's function? Has the law
clerk become the judge? The inquiry seems inevitable whenever the
conversation turns to the law clerk. The only answer , it seems to me,
must rest more on faith than on anything concrete, 136 although there
is room enough for some hard analysis of the issue. Those who would
insist on proofs about the matter will never be satisfied.
As put, the question has the clerk become the judge appears a
bit broad for intelligent response . A narrower, more profitable line
would first ask : Are there any tasks at all that can be delegated to
the clerks without infringing the integrity of the judicial process?
Take baggage toting for instance. Surely even the most zealous
guardian of the judicial function would agree there is nothing judi
cial about the clerk's carrying of the bags. But what of the other
tasks performed by the clerks as we move up from secretary? What
of those tasks generally associated with the grander tradition of the
clerkship institution?
There is much reading in this clerking business. '37 Yet it is hard
to see how a judge is less a judge merely because he makes good use
of his clerk's eyes, as well as his legs. Transcripts on appeal are often
quite thick•:ix and if the question, for example, is the sufficiency of
Nesson, Mr. Ju.� tice Harlan, 85 HARV. L. REV. 390, 391 ( 1971 ) .
t :l6. A legal philosopher might very well say the sa� e th.ing for .justice its� lf. Indeed.
Morris Cohen has written, "That in the long run justice will triumph in the law is a mat t er
of fa i t h not of knowledge . " M. COHEN, Mv PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41 ( 1941 ) .
t :l7. Delmar Karlen's description of the work o f t � e law assis�ants a t t � App.ella t e
.
.
Division of t he New York Supreme Court provides some figures on this account. In view of
. length an the
in
pages
60
to
50
run
to
t h e fact t ha t the briefs in a typical appeal are likely
�
· b of merely studving the papers submit t ed
reni rd on appeal another 350 or 400 pages, t he JO
is a verv large one . " D. KARLEN, supra note 84, at 18. The largest record I encount ered
to back on nn
rnns1sted of 1 1 43 pages of trial transcrip t t ha t ha d t o be read from front
.
gence q e�t ion t o
a l l e gat ion of insuffic iency of the evidenc e to warrant submission of a � egl �
�
·
·
C1rcm t clerk m Detrmt
d m our court that a Sixth
t h e j u rv . S i m i larly, the rumor circulate
.
.
pt to a�sure t he
had be�n assigned the task of wadin g throug h 1 1 v?lumes of tnal transrn
s u f fic.:ie ncv of the evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy ·
.
.
·
11 ate JU dges occurs upon \ 1ewrng t he
J:l8. "One of the sighs frequ ently exhal ed by appe
i:t'i.

�

·

·

·

·

·

.

·

.
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the evidence to prove elements of t h e crime, t hey m us t b e read from
front to back, a task of no slight p hysical e ffort . If t h e cle rk con
cludes that the evidence is s u fficient, his judge c a n s t i l l test t he
validity of this conclusion against the specifi cs of t h e clerk's memo
randum-those pages of testi mony said by t h e clerk t o permit t he
jury to find the necessary elements. Nonetheless, s o m e critics would
insist that the judge read every page for himself. No doub t there are
some appellate judges who m ak e it a point of honor to scrut inize t he
entire transcript, at least in cri m inal cases. But scrutinize for what?
Appeals, even criminal appeals, require allegations o f error; and
when an allegation directs the court's attent ion to th e instruct ions
only, what need is there to examine the uoir dirr? ? Those few cases
in which broad inspection would disclose plain e rror m i g h t not war
rant the time . 139 Furthermore, institutional considerat ions m ight cut
the other way ; is i t the court's function to notice error not raised by
counsel on appeal ? un All of this might even sugges t lea ving the job
of discovering p lain error to the law clerks. B ut t o ret urn to the
allegation of instructional error, is it really a threat t o t h e ju dicial
function to allow the clerk to read the transcript and to report to
his judge that the case was not tried to the jury with bad instru c 
tions, b u t to t h e court with none at all? I have discovered s u c h a
case in the reports. 14 1 Admittedly, s u c h a gross ab erration of appel
late advocacy is rare, but the pattern of alleging error unsupported
in the record is not an infrequent one . To use one judge's c h aracteri 
zation, many appeals, particularly criminal appeals, " m elt when
mass of papers composing the record on appeal . " Hopkins, supra note 124, a t iJ6:1.
139.

Some jurisdictions have statutes or court rules expressly or by cons! ruction allow

ing appellate courts sua sponte to notice plain error, that is, error m a nifest on the face of the
record itself. See, e.g. , 28 U . S . C .

§

2106 ( 1970 ) ; FED. R. CRIM. P . 52( b ) . Thus in t hese

jurisdictions appellate courts are at least empowered to notice plain error with o ut assignment
by counsel on appeal. Whether as a matter of policy these same courts should make it
standard practice to search every record for such error is another question, however. Perhaps
the doctrine is, or should be, limited to saving appellate counsel from omissions at trial, at
least when the point is sufficiently raised on appeal.
In addition some courts hold that it is within their inherent judicial power to notice plain
error. See, e.g. , People v . Dorrikas, 354 Mich. 303, 316, 92 N . W . 2 d 305, 307 ( 1958) ("The
mhe ent P?wer of this Court to prevent fundamental injustice is not limited by what appel
�
lant is entitled to as a matter of right . " ) ; accord, State v . Garcia, 19 N . M . 4 1 4 , 143 P. 1012
( 1914) (on reheari ng) . See generally R. POUND, supra note 105, at 86, 1 3 1 , 185 - 86.
.
140. There is the strict view that unassigned errors will not be considered on appeal.
,
v · Burns, 82 Conn. 213, 219, 72 A . 1083, 1085 ( 1909) ("[The court] cannot be expected
State
.
to examme several ?ages of evidence and numerous exceptions in a search for errors which
counsel have not pomted out either in their appeal or their argumen t . " ) . See generally 5 AM .
.JuR. Appeal & Error
141.

§

654 ( 1962 ) .

People v . Smiley, 17 Mich. App. 351, 169 N . W . 2d 515 ( 1969 ) .
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the records are opened to the l i ght of day." 142 When this is the case

;

the situation i s especially am enable to preliminary screening b

nonjudicial personnel rather than by the judge . To put it simply,

there is little reason why a j udge's time should be spent wading
through thick transcripts to verify the record basis of assignments
or al legations of error.
What a bout research? Is this reading different in kind? I doubt
it. There i s the suggestion today that all legal research be computer
ized to facilitate both advocacy and judgment.143 Yet no one has seen
a threat to the integrity of the courts in this. The same is true of
the clerk's legal research. It is just too hard to imagine Justice
Brandeis himse lf-rather than h is c lerk-researching every page of
the United States Reports looking for that particular point.144 A
judge' s time chart simply won't allow it, 145 and, one suspects, Jus
tice Brandeis probably had little pause about delegating the job to
his clerk anyway.
We reach writing. What about the judge who turns to his clerk

for first drafts? Is he less faithful to his office for it? This aspect of
the de legation calculus is more troublesome ; an analysis of the point
proves more involved. First, it is no answer to say that the judges
are unable to write for themselves in every case because of the press
of tim e . This may be true, but it has nothing to do with our norma
tive inquiry. If by allowing his clerk to write a judge pro tanto
abdicates his office, then we should have more j udges, fewer clerks,
and no drafts at a l l . Nor can we condemn the practice simply be
cause some of our noblest judges would have none of it. Justice
Holmes, for exa m ple, never allowed his clerk to turn a Holmesian
phrase, or even to try. With Holmes the clerk's job was to fill the
opinion with citations of Holmes's favorite author, meaning Holmes
himself. 14'' S imilarly, try to discern any of the clerk's handiwork in
the orchestrations of Justice Musmanno. Still, these same judges
must be asked why they refuse to allow their clerks to prepare the
drafts. Unless the reasons given for the refusal relate to the scope
of the judicial function, no inference about the legitimacy of the
1 42 .

Letter from

h.
,Judge Albert Bryant t o Wi l l Shafrot h . .Jan . 19, 1 9fi7. i n Shnfrot

S11n·1•,· of the Un ited States Courts of Appeals, 42 F . H . D . :14:l, :l 1 4 ( HJfi7 ) . S1•1• also Hr.v nn.
A ('nm·d. :1fi WASH. &
Fu r u .Swifter Crim inal A ppea l - To Protect the Pu nlic as Well as the
L�;f; L. Rr.v. 1 7fi ( 1968 ) .
1
1 4:l. .'i<'e McCabe , A utomate d f,e{ial Research . f,4 .Jun1rATt 'HP. :11tl ( 1 !17 ) .
I ·14 . "' "'' t e x t accompa nying not e 90 wpm .
1' ( 'u urt . l .'bli / r'l"l'1 ,
l ·l!"i. :-; ,.,. H a rt , Fureword: Time ('hart of t h e 0fust ic1"'· Till' Suprl'/11
/:l HAHV. L. Rr.v. 84 ( 1 9!">9) .
l ··Hi. S1•1• Len c h . supra n ot e !"i9. at 1 : 1 .
_

. .
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delegation is permissible either way. In Holmes's case, w and surely
in M us manno's, the reason for the refusal is pride of authorshi p .
There are j udges who like to write for themselves because t o them
the opinion rings true only when cast in their own language. One
wonders about the judgment, however. Pride of authorship and the
judicial office may not run along mutually inclusive lines . Is a dec i 
sion any less a judicial pronouncem ent because t h e clerks had a
hand in the explication? Perhaps it is significant on this point that
nowhere in the literature has a judge taken the position that his
exclusive authorship is essential to the integrity of the ju dicial of
fice . Some judges come very close however. The views of Judge
Edwards of the Sixth Circuit are illustrative:
Law clerks are the most obvious aid to time- pressed

appellate j udges.

I

use the two which the federal government now allows me to save time in every
way I can think of consistent with judicial duty. But no law clerk has ever-or
will ever-write an opinion for me . And I likewise reject the incorporation in
an opinion of language from any law clerk memorandu m . If I write a sentence
I know for certain what I mean. If I copy a sentence, I am by no means so sure .

And I believe lawyers and litigants are entitled to judicial opinions.

iJx

Certainly in these words there is at least the suggestion, if not
an assertion , that writing is for the judge and that copying even a
sentence of the clerk's memorandum is inconsistent with j udicial
duty. And this time the reason assigned for the refusal has nothing
" I have been asked whether I ever wrote an opinion for the Justice. The answer is

147.

an emphatic N O . He had a great pride in his highly individual literary style and any measure
of ghost-writing would have been abhorrent to hi m . " Id.

148.

Edwards, The A voidance of Appellate Delay, Panel Discussion, in Improving Pro

cedu res in the Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D. 5 1 , 68 (emphasis added ) . Nonetheless, Judge
Edwards gives his clerks substantial work to do. His description continues:
But my clerks live with the cases assigned to me in much the same way I do. I never
encourage their recommending any disposition i n preliminary work o n a case. But I do
require them to write a prehearing memo on each case and after assignment of a case to
me for opinion writing, I may assign specific legal issues for in-depth research. I encour
af(e them at this point to think toward disposition-and freely to argue for whatever
point of view they may come to.

Id.
N.

.Judge Learned Hand, who called the law clerks "puisne judges" (see Kurland Jerom

:·rank: Som : Reflec t ions and Recollections o f a Law Clerk, 2 4 U. CHI. L . REV. '661, 663e

.
( 19.17) ), also refused to allow his
clerks to write even a sentence : "[He] wouldn't even let a
la w derk write a sen � ence, not one sentence. He would let the
law clerk criticize. He would
hand what he had written to the law clerk and let him make all the sugges
t.ions he wante d to
. .
makr. Hut not one word of. that opinion was anybody else's bu t L
earne
d
H an d' s. M e dma
'
.
'
.
/ l'rocrs.� In the United States Court of Appea l
.
'/'/II' [)l'!'l.'111/ln
s, second circwt·
How t h e
Wlu·l'ls (,u Round lns1de- w1th Comme nta"'
' .J
' • Address before N ew york C ounty Lawyers'
.
.
.
,
Assoc1at 1nn f orum Evening , Apr. 26, 1962 (typewritten) ' at
27 ' quoted i· n M . SCHICK, supra
not l' 1 1 11. at 107 n.9:1.
"

.

·

.

·

.
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· at all to d o with pride of authorship . Rather, a judge should write
for himself b ecause only then can he know for sure what he means.
But I wo nder whether Judge Edwards is really serious about this
reason ing . S u rely he is not so poor a student of the legal process to
think that l a wyers and litigants read judicial opinions according to
what they th ink the judge intended. Any private unexpressed mean
ing of the j udge is institutionally irrelevant. The opinion is read
instead by reference to what it says ; indeed it should be read only
that way . To illustrate : Lord Nottingham once stated his was the
better construction of the Statute of Frauds because, "I had some
reason to k n ow the meanings of this law ; for it had its first rise from
me. " 1�!1 Yet, as has been pointed out, this view is quite erroneous :
" If Lord Nottingham drew it, he was the less qualified to construe
it, the author of an act considering more what he privately intended
than the m e aning he has expressed." 1 50 Thus one might argue that
the very reason tendered by Judge Edwards for rejecting his clerk's
handiwork cuts in precisely the opposite direction. The young law
graduate fresh from Legal Writing or the Review might be the one
ideally qualified to mesh what his judge means with what the opin
ion says . 1 5 1 And this might even include an occasional Musmanno
opm1on .
What then rem ains of Judge E dwards's view? I suspect he
has already heard of Lord Nottingham, and if not he would probably
adhere to h is own beliefs at any rate. There is just something intui
tive, he would say, that tells him he must write his own opinions.
Again, nothing con crete seems in the offing on this point. I can only
add my own remaining intuitions.
It seems to me too easy an answer to suggest that so long as the
judge decides the case there is no delegation of the judicial function
149.

Ash

v.

Abdy, 36 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch. 1678).

4 J. CAMPBELL , LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL
OF ENGLAND 228 n . 3 ( 1885 ) . I owe the reference to Professor Lon Fuller, who first put all these
thoughts into my head. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 86 n.41 (rev. e d . 1969) . I have
he
a l ways thought, however, that if one has enough sense to recall these things on his own,
THE BRAMBLE
can right.fully claim them for h imself. So d i d Llewellyn . See K . LLEWELLYN ,
150.

Bl!SH 8 ( 1 930).

:

judge s words
"I Llawyers looking fo r all shades and nuances of meaning read t.he
has had cons1dernhl1·
magnifyin g glass. A well-train ed law clerk, especially one who .
.
spoU inJ!
law journal e x perience, can aid his judge in polishing the language of op1111ons and Ill
Judge who is n
a m biguities and other slips that may return to plague the court later. Even n
our own words
pre cise and clear d ra fter can use an editor, for the best of us can be misled
·'ll/Jrll
a n d feel sure that. what is crystal clear to u s is equally clear to all who read . Hrnckn .
wit h

! il l .
a

h�

nute

48.

at

297-98.
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in the draftsmanship of the clerk . 152 Just what is a decision in a case
anyway, if not the opinion itself? Is it so clear that the court's
opinion is severable from its judgm ent? Perhaps the n ature of the
judicial process is su c h that judgment e m erges only as the opinion
is written . More than enough students of the law, even the j uris
prudes, have had trouble keeping the conc;epts of decision, opinion,
and judgment straight and clear of each other . 1 ":1 Their borders are
too impalpable, too plastic; these concepts shade into one another.
Accordingly, the solution that writing is not judging seems to m e too
facile. It is at least possible, then, to talk sensibly about whether a
clerk should b e allowed to prepare the drafts, acknowledging this
time that some of his sentences m ay come close to the ra tio, 1 " 4 to
the heart of the judicial process itself. This, as best I can p ut it, is
what may very we ll be bothering those who intuitively would insist
that the judge write it all for himself. 155
Yet even with the inquiry thus redrawn we can proceed along
analytical lines only one step further. The rest is all a m atter of
faith . There are sentences, and there are sentences. Some are like
baggage toting-they can be drafted by the clerk and incorporated
into the opin ion without endange ring the judge 's integrity, qua
judge . Other sentences, however-indeed even a naked word-may
commit the court along paths of law the j udges themse lves are un
willing to travel . These are the sentences that strain the legiti macy
of the writing delegation the hardest. Let me flesh in all this disquis152.

Albeit this is the answer generally given i n the literature. See, e.g. , M. SCHICK,

supra note 1 16 , at 107: "Law clerks probably exaggerate their influence because most of them
do in fact draft some opinions; they fail to recognize that this is not the same as deciding the
outcome of appeals."

153.

Cf. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 92-93 ( 1968 ) ; Cohen, Transcendental Nonsen8e

and the Functional Approa ch, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 844 (1935); Frank, What Courts Do in

Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 657 (1932).
154 . The jurisprudes also have been confused about just what this term means. See
Goodhart The Ratio ecidendi of a Case, 22 MODERN L. REv. 1 1 7 ( 1959); Simpson,
The Ratio
'.
lJec1dend1 of a Case, id. at 453; Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, id. a t 597. Cf,
Cohen.
supra note 153, at 844 n.82.

!J

J .'i:'i. At t h e Institute Judge Jack Day of the Ohio Court of Appeals opened his presenta.
t ion wi t h t he remark that he never allows his clerk to draft opinions for
h i m . I later asked
why. and he suggested that, indeed, to him writing is judging and that
sometim es draftsma n
s 1p m y come too clo�e to judging. For this reason
h e prefers to keep all the writing to
�
_
_
_
h 1 1nself
. w1t hou t beli t t h g thos e Judge who allow their clerks to draft
some of the opinion .
�
�
_
_
. J udg e Day co nfessed
an ncons1st
ency m his position , however, since he require s
�
his clerk to
_
prq>are t h e hrst
ralt_ of t h e Syllabus in each case , which in Ohio
alone is the law. Judge
Day d ele ga t es this task. however , because he puts Oh1"o's Syllabus pract ice
.
m t h e same
.
cat ef.(or�' as loothall. Telephone conversation with Judge Jack
G . Day, Sept. 20, 1972. See
r1111l' fiH suprn.

�

�

·
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ition with s o m e specifics. What harm to the judicial process to allow
the clerk to state the facts? Any first-year student knows the facts
are not the l a w . What harm to allow the clerk to state in a draft that
the action is one

ex

contractu, o mitting Mrs. Qui ckly's details about

the white hat and sea-coal fire? 156 Yet there is controversy even here.
It was Justice Holmes himself, I think, who said that if permitted
to state the facts, j udgment in his favor would necessarily follow. 157
Passing over this difficulty, think of the con_stitutional j udgment
implicit in t h e sin gle word "penumbra . " 158 I know it was Justice
Holmes who said that words are not like crystals, forever unchanged
and transparent. A word " is the skin of a living thought. "1 59 And the
thought may prove more law than literature.
If all of what I have said is true, then as an abstract m atter as
well as a day-to-day reality there would appear nothing wrong in the
draftsm anship of the clerk, 1 60 provided the judge has the good sense
to retouch the draft to eliminate any sentences or words not to his
liking. And the retouching process is essential-it not only protects
an individual interest in style, but it also guarantees the judge's
fidelity to law. It determines whether the course of judicial duty will
run straight and true. It is precisely here that one m ust abandon
further analysis and rest final opinion on faith alone : can the judges
be trusted to weed out any writing that smacks of judgment?
l fi6 .

See O . W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, i n COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 168

( 1 920 ) .
J.57.

Cf- Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium , 3 1 COLUM. L . REv. 82,

8:i ( 1 9:) 1 ) :
T he Judge's selection, stress and arrangement of "the facts" can m a ke the most
peculiar case look l i ke routine. We know from l i fe that most cases are, before this fact
manipulation begins, peculiar. Manipulation-nay, perception-of "the facts" is all
i mportant.; j udges, like witnesses, observe d ifferently according to temperament and
circumstances_ Judges read the evidence they get with an eye to their views of just ice:
"t he facts" t.ake shape in court in the light. of the resu lt to he achieved.
Perhaps the i m portance of this fact perception is what .Judge Medina of t h e Second
C ircu i t had in m i n d when h e explained his refusal to allow his clerks to st a t e the fa r t s on
a ppl'a l : "I do not believe [ th a t l is the kind of t h ing you can turn over t o a l a w dt>rk who
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C o u r t of A pp1•als, Second Circu it-Ho11• t h e Whel'ls (;11 f{u u n d lnsid1· ll'il h
Cr111w1 1•n tnrv. Address before New York Coun ty Lawyers' Associat ion Foru m E\'C'n i ng. A p r .
:.!Ii. l !lli2 ( t y iPwri t t e n ) , at 2 2 , qu11t1•d i n M . SCHICK, .m prn not e I Hi. nt I O!i.
S t a l l's

·-

;

l f1H_
l fi!I_

81•1• Cri swolcl v . Conncc t i rn t , :lR I U . S . 479. 4H4 ( Wfi f >l .
Towne v . Eisnt>r. 245 l l . S . 4 1 8. 4:.!!"1 ( l !l 1 8 L

I f;(}_ S1•1• Med i n a . suprn note R:!. at ! f1 4 :
ThPn· is no rpason under t he s 1 1 n wn:v a _j11 dgl' should not nil\'(' h i s l a w dt•rk d rn l'I
an o p inion for his rev ision and a p prov a l . nor is t hl• la\v apt lo sul l't'r in Hll_\' su hst n n l i n l
1111•ns i 1 rl' if l hC' .iud gc•s a rc• not ('onst nnt l�· st riving t n c•m 1 1 l a l c• t ill' st \'lt• n f n l l ol mt·s. n r 11
l .1•amc•d H a n d or a Cardozo_

[Vol.

VA NDERBIL T LA W R E VIE W

1 1 70

26

The suggestion that judges are incapab le of decidin g for them
selves or even that their judgme nts are uncons ciously influenced by
the clerks has always left a bad taste in my mouth. There is just
somethi ng too Machia vellian about these ideas . In prepari n g my

remarks I thought it might be interestin g to see if Niccolo himself
had anything to say on the question . I discovere d an entire chapter,
"Of the Secretarie s of Princes, " on the subject. I have already men
tioned the idea that a good secretary reflects fa vorab ly on the pru
dence of his prince . 161 But there are some more thoughts that for me
are more than an ironic twist. They put an end to our delegation
mqu1ry:
There was nobody who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the mi nister
of Pandolfo Petru cci, Prince of Siena, who did not consider Pandolfo to be a
very prudent man, having him for his minister. There are three different kinds
of brains, the one und erstands things unassisted, the other understands things
when shown by others, the third understands neither alone nor with the ex
planations of others. The first kind is most excellent, the second also excellent,
but the third useless. It is therefore evident that if Pandolfo was not of the first
kind, he was at any rate of the second. For every time the prince has the
judgment to know the good and evil that anyone does or says, even if he has
no originality of intellect, yet he can recognize the bad and good works of his
min ister and correct the one and encourage the other; and the minister cannot
hope to deceive him and therefore remains good. 182

In my own experience Judge Gillis had the brain that under
stands things unassisted, although he often let me believe he under
stood better with my hel p . And after working out a l l these thoughts
about delegation in my own mind I have come to respect h i m all the
more for Judge Gillis was wise enough to strike out of the d raft any
incautious words sprinkled along the way . From my own year I am
certain he always made the decisions . But of equal i m port, Judge
Gillis's was always the pen of final judgment. Furthermore, I would
accept it on faith that all judges are like Pandolfo; that as individu
als they possess the essential qualities of their social office ; that they
possess the good sense to recognize the bad and good work that their
clerks do or write; and that all judges, like Judge G i llis for me,
correct the one and encourage the other.
And what of the clerk? Not only is he unable to deceive his
1 6 1 . See text accom panying note 6 1 supra.
I n his letter to the Times comme nting on
Professor Bickel's article, see note 4 supra,
Judge Hofstadter detaile d the historic recede nts
p
_
for statf assistan
ce:
Leonardo's students worked on his canva
·
ses·, Duma s had h1s
' assem b ly 1 me o f coau t hors; and Herbert Spencer drew on a
group of collaborators · ·
. A n d even E'mstem
·
an d Bo hr b u 1·1 t on the work of a host of resea
rch assist ants.
1 62. N. MACH IAVELLI, THE PRINCE 1 14
(Mentor ed. Ricci trans l. 1952) .
·
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judge, but I would a d d , he would not try. A good clerk knows good
Jaw when he sees i t ; h e recognizes that before good judgment there
is the need for m u c h hard thinking and that when j udgment finally
comes its rationale m ust rise to the surface in a written opinion. I
am sure, alth o u gh you must accept this on faith too, that the clerk's
work-be it recom m endation, memo, or draft-will reflect these
essential qual ities of law itse lf, and that amidst all the explication
there is hardly room for deception . Finally, I am convinced that
those called to the institution bring to it the personal qualities of
the good min ister:
For a prince to be able to know a minister there is this method which never
fa ils. When you see the m inister think more of himself than of you, and in all
his actions seek his own profit, such a man will never be a good minister, and
you can never rely on h i m ; for whoever has in hand the state of another must
never think of hi mself but of the prince, and not mind anything but what
relates to him. 1••

I for one woul d accept the assertion that all clerks think only of their
judges; and that the clerk, like his j udge, struggles daily to serve our
own prin ce: the Law . 164

APPENDIX
The ide a of a formal training program for law clerks was first
given serious consi deration by several j udges of the Louisiana
Courts of Appea l , J udges M .D . Miller and John T. Hood in particu
lar. Originally the plan was to hold a conference for Louisiana's law
clerks alone. J udge Lesinski, who eventually served as consultant to
the first Law C lerk Institute, was exposed to the idea after meeting
these judges at one of the yearly Appellate Judges Seminars . Judge
Lesinski thought the idea of a workshop for clerks a sound one, and
in his official capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Appellate Judges
Conference and a me m ber of its Education Committee he contacted
Associate Dean Francis Sullivan, of the Louisiana State University
Law Schoo l , to plan for a national conference of prospective clerks.
After several consultations with Judge Lesinski, the program for the
first Institute was established and a prospectus was sent to appel
late judges throughout the country, together with a schedule of fees.
The response to the first Law Clerk Institute far exceeded the
expect ations of its planners. Notwithstanding a substantial fee per
l (i:I. ld. al 1 1 4 - 1 5 .
h u t <l1·sirn·
l fi4 . "The great est influence o f t hese clerks. h y nn<l large. hns hel'll ! he rnn•
.
7
l
:l
l
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.
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h i t· one of n•ll'nt. less scholarship. " N ewland.
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registra nt, almost 70 law clerks were sent by t h e i r judges to participate in the progr am.
.
The curriculum for the first Institute was spread over three
days and consisted of the following subject areas . Faculty are liste d
in the adjac ent colum n.
Subject

Fa rn l t �'

The Law Clerks: Profile of an

P a u l R. B a ier, Assi s t a n t Proft>ssor of I .aw. Louisiana

Institution

State University

Judge and Clerk: Ethics of the

Honorable Albert Tate . J r . . Assoc i a t e . J u s t i c e . L ou i si a n a

Job

Supreme Court

Logic and Judicial Reasoning

Honorable .Jack C . Day . Judge, O h i o Court of Appeals
.

S t ock meyer .J r . ,

Working Tools, Appellate Struc

N.O.

tures, New Approaches

Court of Appeals

Re s e a rc h Director.

M i c h igan

English: Classical Structure and

Dwight W . Stevenson, Professor of En glish. College of

Style of Writing

Engineering, University of M ic h igan
Honorab l e Robert T. M an n , .J udge, Florida Court of

Opinion Writing

Appeal
Writing Exerc i se : Criti que of

Paul R. B a ier, Assist a n t Professor of Law. Louisiana

Draft Opinions

State University
Honorable Albert Tate ,J r., Associ a t e .Justice. Louisiana
Supreme Court

Impact Decisions

(3

faculty)

Honorable William A . Grimes. Assoc i a t e .Justice, New
Ha mpshire Supreme Court
C h eney C. Joseph, Assistant Professor of Law, Lo uisiana
State University

Except for the welcoming an d invocation addresses, each pres
entation was intended to b e informal ; the exchange of questions and
answers between clerks and fa culty was encouraged . The subjects
were taught in small seminar rooms at the Louisiana State Univer
sity Law Center, and because the number of registrants exceeded
anticipated e nrollment, the clerks were split into two groups of
about 30 each . Faculty schedules were then rearranged to require
two classes per subject area in order to keep the sessions as small
and informal as possible .
An important part of the Institute was a writing exercise requir
ing the clerks to prepare a draft j udicial opinion in advance of the
program . The case used in the exercise was People

v.

Henley, 26

Mich . App . 1 5 , 182 N .W .2d 19 ( 1970) . Clerks were instructed to
assume that they worked for the Michigan Court of Appeals on
remand of the ap � eal from the Michigan Supreme Court, see People
v . Henley, 382 M ich. 143, 169 N .W.2d 299 ( 1969 ) ; they were told to
� repare a d � aft opinion in the case resolving the question of double
.1eopard_Y raised on appeal by defendant Henley . A hypothetical trial
transcript was sent to each clerk in advance of the Institute, to-
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gether with a collection of relevant research materials. No indepen
dent research was required . Although the Henley appeal had been
decided and an opinion was published in the case, the clerks were
asked for pedagogical p urposes not to read the actual report until
their own work was complete . These drafts were then critiqued as a
portion of the lnstitute's program .
Although t h e work required t o complete the writing exercise
was substant i a l , more than 50 percent of the participants turned in
their drafts before the progra m , reflecting a sincere desire to im
prove clerkship performance. Although at times the critique session
was hotly cri tical of some of these proposed opinions, the spirit was
one of complete candor. All willin gly participated, including those
subject to the greatest criticism, again in the interest of upgrading
performance of this i mportant aspect of the clerk's function.
During their three -day stay at the Institute, the law clerks were
housed together as a group in Pleasant Hall, a residence dormitory
on the Louisiana State University campus near the Law Center.
Two of the faculty, Justices Grimes and Tate, lived with the clerks
during their stay in an effort to expose the new clerks, perhaps for
the first time, to the i mportant conception of the j udge as human
being, as well as j urist. Toward the same end, all the clerks, judges,
and other fa culty spent an informal evening together, beginning
with a seafood b uffet and ending with much conversation between
cl erk and judge .
At the conclusion of the progra m Judge Lesinski chaired a cri
tique session a mong the Institute 's planners and faculty. Several
judges of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, who had been present as
observers during the three days, also attended. It was the consensus
that a sound beginning had been made and that the first effort
proved worthwhile. It was decided that the Institute shou ld con
tinue as an annual event. Suggestions for i mprovement of the pro
gram in the future were tendered and discussed.
B efore leaving, each clerk was instructe d to critique the pro
gra m himself a fter actually working for a while as a clerk and to offer
suggestions about reshaping the Institute' s curriculu m in the future.
A lthough it is too early to report the reaction s of the particip ati.ng
cle rks, some pre l i m inary commen ts indicate that they too consid
ered their time and effort well spent. In particul ar, one clerk wrote :

" I personally felt a good deal stronger in com mencin g my job the
follo wing week . "
Throughout the program one theme was rei � erated whene v� r
.
possible: The l a w clerks are an institu tion. Hopefully wit h t hat 1 11
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mind and with a sense of commitment to the traditions of the office
the participating clerks set about their work, the Institute b ehind
the m , on a stronger footing.
The following is a list of the courts represented at the first
Institute . The listing is alphabetical by state, together with the
names of judges who sent their clerks and the clerks' names.
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Iowa

Alabama
As�u.: ;atc ,Justice H1 1 g h M a d dox

Chief .Justice C. E. Moore

S u p r e m e C o u r t of A l a b a m a

Supreme Court of Iowa

,J o h n W . Parker

Bill O'Brien
Kansas

Associate .Justice Pelham .) . Merrill
Supreme Court of A l a b a m a
Clellon K . Haeder

A r i z on a

Chief Justice Harold R. Fatzer
Supreme Court of Kansas
Edwin P. Carpenter

C h ief .Judge Herbert K r u ck er

Associate Justice A . S . Schroeder

Court of Appeals, Div. 2

Supreme Court of Kansas

Harley Kurlander

Douglas C. Richards

.Judge .J a m es D . Hathaway
Court of Appea'is, Div. 2
Robert M a n t i el

Kentucky
Chief Justice Samuel Steinfeld
Court of Appeals of Kentucky

.J udge Lawrence Howard

Max Schwartz

Court of Appeals, D i v . 2

James A. Bailey

Phyllis Sugar

Associate Justice Scott Reed
Florida

Associate .Justice Hal P . Dekle
Supreme Court of Florida

Court of Appeals of Kentucky
Robert Walker
Associate Justice John S. Palmore
Court of Appeals of Kentucky

M i chael Hastings
C h ief .Judge S a m S pector

Julia K . Tackett

1 st Dist. Court of Appeal
Cynthia Turnicliff

Louisiana
Associate Justice John Dixon

.J udge ,Joh n S. Rawls

Supreme Court of Louisiana

1 st Dist. Court of Appeal

Robert Szabo

Elaine Duggar

Associate Justice Albert Tate, .Jr.

C h i ef .Judge Thomas Barkd u l l , Jr.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

:Jrd D i st. Court of Appeal

Vance Andrus

Robert C. M a rkey

Todd Gremillion

I l linois

Judge Frederick E l l is
1st Circuit Court of Appeal

. J us t ice G lenn Seidenf eld
Appellat e Court, 2nd Dist.

Maurice LeGardeur

Lauren ce Templ er

,Judge C. Lenton Sartain

.Just ice Harold Trapp
Appellate Court, 4th Dist.

Judge H.W. Ayres

Ann Rlandford

.Just ice Caswell Crebs
A ppellate Court, 5th Dist.

2nd Circuit Court of Appeal
.Jean T. Drew
,Judge Pike Hall, .Jr.

W i l l i a m Thomas

.J ust ice G eorge Moran
A ppe l l a t e Court, 5th Dist.

Frank Mansfield

2nd Circuit Court of Appeal
Edwin L. Cahra
.Judge .Jesse Heard
2nd Circuit Court of Appeal

Indiana
Associate ,Justice Donald H. Hunter
S u prem e C o u rt of Indiana

David Gotshall

1st Circuit Court of Appeal
,James H. Morgan

Alex Rubenstein
,Judge O.E. Price
2nd Circ uit Court of Appeal
Stephen Glas sell
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Nevada

.Judge Minos D . Miller, Jr.
�rd Circuit Court of Appeal

Chief Justice David Zenoff

Eugene Callaway

Supreme Court of Nevada

,Judge ,James C. Gulotta

Sally S. Davis

4th Circuit Court of Appeal
Kay K. Norman
,Judge Harry T. Lemmon
4th Circuit Court of Appeal
Celeste Tanner

New H a m pshire
Chief Justice F . R . Kenison
Supreme Court of New H a mpshire
Charles Doleac
New Mexico

,Judge Edward Stoulig
4th Circuit Court of Appeal

Associate Justice ,John B . McMannus, .Jr.

John R. Ates

Supreme Court of New Mexico

Judge L . C . Bertrand

William Prim

.Judge Douglas J. Nehrbass
15th Judicial District Court
Dale Martin
Judge William T. Bennett
20th ,Judicial District Court
Phil Miley

New York
Judge Frank Del Vecchio
S u preme Court, A p p e l l a t e D i vision, 4th
Dept.
Mary Lou Crowley
Oklahoma

Judge Fred S. Bowes
24th Judicial District Court

Judge Tom Brett

Harry T. Hardin

Court of Criminal Appeals

Judge Joseph A. LaHaye

Penn Lerblanc

27th Judicial District Court

Judge Robert D. S i ms

Patrick Morrow

Court of Criminal Appeals

Judge James C. Terrell

C. Michael Zacharias

30th Judicial District Court
Fred Chevalier

Rhode Island
Chief Justice Thomas H. Roberts

Michigan
Chief Judge T. John Lesinski

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Richard Licht
Associate Justice A . H . Joslin

Court of Appeals
Philip M. Stevens
Judge John W . Fitzgerald

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Donald M iller
Associate Justice Thomas K e l leher

Court of Appeals
Ernest Phillips

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Minnesota

Associate .Justice Donald Peterson
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Burton Hanson
Missouri
Chief .Just.ice .James A. Finch, Jr.
Supreme Court of M issouri
Richard Brownlee
Associate .Justice Robert T. Donnelly
Su preme Court of M i ssouri

Edward Radio
Associate Justice Thomas Paolino
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Angelica Bevilacqua
Associate Justice W i l l i a m E. Powers
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Stephen Famglietti
South Carolina
Associate Justice J . M . Brai lsford, .Jr .
Supreme Court o f South Carolina

P a t rick Dohert y

Kenneth Wood ington

Associ a t e .Justice .Joseph .I. Si meone

Associate Justice Bruce Littlej ohn

St . Louis Court of Appeals
M a r�· Ann Weems
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Tennessee
Judge Charles Galbreath

Court of Criminal Appeals

G. Michael DeGeurin

Court of Criminal Appeals

Judge Truman Roberts

Will iam Bozeman

Court of Criminal Appeals

Texas

David Cook

Chief .Judge .John Onion, .Jr.

Commissioner Carl E.F. Dally

Court of Criminal Appeals

Court of Criminal Appeals

Russell Busby

Don Nelson

Judge Leon Douglas

Comm issioner Thomas G. Davis

Court of Criminal Appeals

Court of Criminal Appeals

.John Drolla

Herman Little

Judge W . A . Morrison
Court of Criminal Appeals
Bertha S . Ross
.Judge Wendell A. Odom

United States Court of Appeals
Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.
4th Circuit Court of Appeals
James D. Myers
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ition with s o m e specifics. What harm to the judicial process to allow
the clerk to state the facts? Any first-year student knows the facts
are not the l a w . What harm to allow the clerk to state in a draft that
the action is one

ex

contractu, o mitting Mrs. Qui ckly's details about

the white hat and sea-coal fire? 156 Yet there is controversy even here.
It was Justice Holmes himself, I think, who said that if permitted
to state the facts, j udgment in his favor would necessarily follow. 157
Passing over this difficulty, think of the con_stitutional j udgment
implicit in t h e sin gle word "penumbra . " 158 I know it was Justice
Holmes who said that words are not like crystals, forever unchanged
and transparent. A word " is the skin of a living thought. "1 59 And the
thought may prove more law than literature.
If all of what I have said is true, then as an abstract m atter as
well as a day-to-day reality there would appear nothing wrong in the
draftsm anship of the clerk, 1 60 provided the judge has the good sense
to retouch the draft to eliminate any sentences or words not to his
liking. And the retouching process is essential-it not only protects
an individual interest in style, but it also guarantees the judge's
fidelity to law. It determines whether the course of judicial duty will
run straight and true. It is precisely here that one m ust abandon
further analysis and rest final opinion on faith alone : can the judges
be trusted to weed out any writing that smacks of judgment?
l fi6 .

See O . W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, i n COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 168

( 1 920 ) .
J.57.

Cf- Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium , 3 1 COLUM. L . REv. 82,

8:i ( 1 9:) 1 ) :
T he Judge's selection, stress and arrangement of "the facts" can m a ke the most
peculiar case look l i ke routine. We know from l i fe that most cases are, before this fact
manipulation begins, peculiar. Manipulation-nay, perception-of "the facts" is all
i mportant.; j udges, like witnesses, observe d ifferently according to temperament and
circumstances_ Judges read the evidence they get with an eye to their views of just ice:
"t he facts" t.ake shape in court in the light. of the resu lt to he achieved.
Perhaps the i m portance of this fact perception is what .Judge Medina of t h e Second
C ircu i t had in m i n d when h e explained his refusal to allow his clerks to st a t e the fa r t s on
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